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ABSTRACT

Giles, Stephen C., Ph.D., University of South Alabama, December 2022. Reducing the
Cost of Agency: Looking Beyond Top Management Teams. Chair of Committee:
William E. Gillis, Ph.D.

The year 2020 demonstrates that powerful forces exist in the external
environment, which may threaten a firm’s survival, but agency problems, within the
organization, persist even in years where there are minimal external pressures on the
firm. Agency costs can present meaningful challenges to the firm beyond the chief
executive and top management team, and the concept of agency is applicable to all
employees, not just management. An organizational learning culture is proposed to both
aid firms in reducing the cost associated with agency, as well as to enable firms to adapt
to rapid changes in the external environment. In this study, the three proposed
antecedents of an organizational learning culture are organizational identification, an
innovation climate, and team empowerment, and the two measures of collective
psychological ownership and organizational citizenship behaviors organizational are
proposed as favorable outcomes. When firms look to decrease agency costs, it is
important to consider that all firm employees can aggregately influence these costs, and
thus, it is important to look beyond top management teams.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The timeless adage still rings true that “if you want something done right, then
you have to do it yourself.” The first thing to note about this statement is that the person
desiring the successful completion of the task in a business context is either the legal
owner or feels a sense of ownership for the task. In this case, I refer to the person who
wants a task completed as the principal who has a greater vested interest in a successful
task completion than does the person who was asked to complete the task, referred to as
the agent (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). As the connotation of the adage suggest, this vested
interest may drive the principal to complete the task without the involvement of the
agent, simply because the cost may be prohibitive to monitor the actions of the agent
effectively (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Additionally, if the principal does not delegate
the task, this then gives rise to the discussion of opportunity cost, because the cost of the
principal performing the task, which should have been delegated to the agent, is often
more valuable than the dollar amount of the principal’s wage (Shaw, 1992). Not only is
the principal’s time valuable, but in practical terms, having the principal engage in every
firm task likely limits the efficiency and productivity of an organization. Internal
problems, such as agency and monitoring costs can influence firm outcomes, but external
influences can impact firm outcomes as well.
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A black swan event is an unforeseen event with substantial and extensive
consequences to the broader environment and, if other recent black swan events have not
emphasized this point enough, 2020 demonstrates that the broader environment has a
considerable vote in organizational outcomes (Phan & Wood, 2020). In the first week of
April 2020, the U.S. unemployment rate surged from a near record low of 3.5% to above
10% due to the COVID-19 pandemic and, in that single week, the new unemployment
claims jumped by 6.6 million (Cox, 2020). This recent black swan event reveals that no
industry is exempt from environmental forces, but some are more susceptible to rapid
changes than others, namely services businesses. In 2020, restaurants were forced to
transform their business models over a very short period from a dine-in experience to
delivery, takeout, and curbside services, and the change in the business model also altered
previous industry models for satisfactory levels of labor expenses and packaging
expenses (Trentmann & Maurer, 2020). In sum, many organizations were coerced into
ceasing business operations, laying off staff, contending with decreased demand for
products and services, navigating through supply chain disruptions, and managing
dwindling cash on hand more efficiently (Bartik et al., 2020). Thus, in addition to internal
problems of agency, the broader environment presents challenges for the firm as well,
and it should be noted that the terms firm and organization are used here interchangeably.
While the environment and agency both influence firm outcomes, there are more
variables outside of the firm than within, and while some studies demonstrate the
possibility of a firm’s impact on the environment, it is very difficult for firms to influence
external variables (Smith & Cao, 2007). Therefore, since the environment theoretically
impacts all organizations indiscriminately, it is important to focus on the internal
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variables that an organization may be able to assert some control over. These areas of
focus include things such as the agency relationship and organizational culture.
Agency theory is based upon the premise that agents will have divergent interests
from principals, and this divergence creates costs for the principal, referred to as agency
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Although there has been much work on agency theory,
some note that legal or formal ownership precedes heightened feelings of psychological
ownership, and the general premise of agency is that when the principal employs an agent
to perform a service, the principal experiences two problems associated with agency
(Sieger et al., 2013). The first problem is that the principal and agent have different
motivations and goals, and it may be challenging or costly for the principal to ensure the
agent is acting in the best interest of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). The second
problem is associated with divergences between how the agent and the principal view
risk, as the risk tolerance of the principal may be lower than the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Even if the principal’s interest may be aligned with the agent through granting the agent
an equity stake in the company, their risk tolerances for investing in new ventures may
still be different (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), because the principal likely invested
personally accumulated capital into the firm, where the agent did not (Panda & Leepsa,
2017).
Agency problems can be categorized into three dimensions, Type I, Type II, and
Type III. The Type I problem of agency centers around information asymmetry and nonmutual risk tolerance within the principal-agent relationship. A Type II problem is one
between majority and minority stockholders. A Type III agency problem occurs between
stockholders and creditors (Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Shao et al., 2013). The focus of this
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study is the Type I agency problem, which is between the principals and agents. There
are numerous identified causes for Type I agency problems such as separation of
ownership and control, risk preference, duration of involvement of the agent, limited
earnings, information asymmetry, and moral hazard (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). While the
level of analysis for studies on agency theory have primarily focused on the owner’s
relationship with the chief executive, any relationship where there is a delegation of a
task to another individual responsible for completing the task could be considered an
agency relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). This raises an important question: if principal and
agent relationships exist throughout the organization, do the collective agency costs of
these relationships matter? “Who plays the roles of principal and agent depends on the
research question at hand, and opportunism directed toward the principal can be
manifested in different ways, depending on the context” (Cruz et al., 2010, p. 72).
As the preceding section alludes, there is potential for agency theory to extend
beyond the CEO and top management team or TMT, and this premise transitions the
discussion to the first of two primary research questions. Does the cost associated with
the entire set of principal-agent relationships in an organization matter to organizational
performance? Although most studies have looked at the CEO or TMT, some studies have
looked at senior managers, which were defined as functional area department heads
(Sieger et al., 2013), and with the relatively broad concept of a principal delegating tasks
for an agent to complete, this suggest that agency may apply to employees throughout all
echelons to the lowest levels of the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989). Historically, it is
understandable that the primary focus of the research has been to examine the top
echelons of management, as decisions they make can have a meaningful and direct

4

influence on costs. However, if the agency relationship exists at the lowest levels of the
organization, then employees aggregately may have a meaningful influence on agency
cost.
In the literature, the key distinction between the principal and the agent is merely
a matter of a formal or legal ownership interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, as
alluded to earlier, legal ownership does not necessarily explore the psychological aspect
of ownership (Sieger et al., 2013), and some argue that psychological ownership may
exist in the absence of a formal ownership interest, which transitions the discussion to the
second research question (Pierce et al., 2001). How does a firm minimize the problems
associated with agency, in the absence of legal ownership interest? Researchers find that
some well compensated executives preside over poorly performing firms, and some argue
that granting formal ownership to the agent does not automatically initiate feelings of
ownership on a psychological level (Pierce et al., 2001). Psychological Ownership (PO)
is a feeling of ownership of a tangible or intangible object, and this individual feels as
though this target of ownership is “mine” (Pierce et al., 2001). PO is examined at the
collective or group level of analysis as well, and Pierce and Jussila (2010) introduce the
construct of Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO). Agency theory and PO theory
have been examined in tandem previously, but this analysis was performed at the
individual, rather than the collective level (Sieger et al., 2013). Pierce and Jussilla (2010),
in their seminal piece on CPO hypothesize the relationship between group learning and
CPO, and for the learning to be ongoing, it is important to examine it through the more
durable lens of culture.
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Odor (2019) refers to organizational learning as “the change in an organization’s
knowledge base that occurs due to past experience,” and she refers to a learning
organization as a byproduct of organizational learning (p. 1). Schein (2017) identifies
multiple distinctive elements of an organizational culture, and he defines culture in terms
of an aggregated, collective learning process to solve both internal and external problems,
which is based on the organization’s values. These artifacts, values, and assumptions of
culture influence organization members’ thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and behavior.
Combining the concepts of organizational learning, a learning organization, and culture,
an Organizational Learning Culture (OLC) is defined as an organizational system of
shared beliefs that places great emphasis on the value of learning, both conceptually and
in practice, and these shared beliefs and values drive organizational behaviors towards
continual learning. This culture of collective learning likely precedes these feelings of
psychological ownership at the collective level.
CPO “is the collectively held sense (feeling) that this target of ownership (or a
piece of that target) is collectively ‘ours’ ” (Pierce & Jussila, 2010, p. 812). This
emergent state of ownership affect can be directed towards tangible objects, such as a
conference room table, or the more abstract things such as ideas and organizations (Pierce
& Jussila, 2010). Given that the problem of agency proposed above suggest an analysis at
the collective level based upon the aggregate influence of individual employees on
agency costs, the construct of psychological ownership should also be evaluated at the
collective organization level.
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1.1 Statement of the Problem
The motivation to study the magnitude of agency is driven by the potential
collective impact of agency costs, extending throughout the organization, because while
an employee’s agency cost may be insignificant at the individual level, the aggregate
influence may be meaningful. It is commonly accepted that the CEO and TMT have the
most direct and meaningful influence on firm performance (Mackey, 2008), but there is
also a need to examine the collective influence of employees on agency cost, throughout
all levels of the organization. There are a few problems associated with the current
literature on agency, CPO, and OLC.
The first problem is that firm employees could easily be inferred to be agents,
who are individually delegated the completion of a task by a principal (Eisenhardt, 1989),
albeit indirectly through a manager, but the agency literature has yet to examine these
phenomena below the top management level fully. Stated differently, both first line
managers and TMT members occupy both roles of principal and agent, and the only true
agents in a firm are the line employees, with no supervisory responsibility. Examining
agency theory throughout the organization, although more tedious than at the CEO and
TMT level, should provide valuable insights about the extent of the problems associated
with agency at all echelons of the organization. Additionally, by not examining these
phenomena at the lowest employee level, it is posited that some of the variance in agency
cost is potentially being left unexplained.
The second problem is that if line employees can aggregately influence agency
costs, then it logically follows that agency may be present in organizations where a firm
manager is also the sole owner, which some contend are mutually exclusive (Ang et al.,
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2000). Stated differently, the authors argue that agency costs are not present when the
sole owner is also the firm manager, because the interest of the dual hatted sole
owner/manager must necessarily be aligned. While on the surface it seems as though
there is merit to this argument, some researchers find that firms managed by the sole
owner post inferior performance in relation to their separated owner/manager
counterparts, at generating net income (Lauterbach & Vaninsky, 1999). One possible
explanation for this is that there is perfect alignment between the interest of the individual
serving as both agent and principal in firms where the manager is the sole owner, but the
firm owner does not value maximizing the efficiency of the firm. However, the more
likely explanation is that agency costs exist in all firms, regardless of whether the
manager is also the sole owner.
The final problem with the literature is that while some researchers have
identified PO as a potential method for overcoming the challenges associated with
agency, there do not appear to be any that examine CPO (Sieger et al., 2013). Within this
same vein, the literature does not specifically identify OLC as an antecedent of CPO, but
some do note that the investment of time, energy, and attention towards a culture of
learning is likely to incite an enhanced sense of CPO (Pierce & Jussila, 2010).
Additionally, given that most firms are not publicly traded, the access to the various
metrics for measuring agency costs (e.g., asset turnover ratio, expense ratio, Tobin’s Q,
and ROA) is limited, and there are few proximal measures for the above financial metrics
(Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Having proximal measures for assessing the degree of agency
cost may be helpful, especially in organizations without a profit motive. Even though PO
is identified as a potential method for overcoming the challenges with agency, it is an
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affective state, rather than a behavioral outcome (Sieger et al., 2013). Examining
affective states in tandem with behavioral outcomes may provide greater insight into the
relationship between CPO and agency, and Organizational Citizenship Behavior is shown
to have a relationship with PO (Liu et al., 2012; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). However,
both studies had cross-sectional designs, and it is difficult to ascertain the directionality
or simultaneity of these relationships.

1.2 Contribution
In this study, I am setting out to make four contributions to theory. First, this
study attempts to further integrate agency theory and PO theory by examining this
relationship at the collective level, which has previously only been evaluated at the
individual level (Sieger et al., 2013). The reason for examining these phenomena at the
individual level is likely the limited number of participants available in each
organization, as Sieger et al. (2013) utilized only department heads, and most other
studies of Type I agency problem focus solely on the CEO or TMT (Panda & Leepsa,
2017). By examining this relationship at the collective level, I anticipate a greater
richness of understanding of this relationship between CPO and agency.
Second, this study will attempt to extend prior work by applying agency theory to
all organization members, because prior studies have primarily evaluated agency at the
top management level (Sieger et al., 2013). Although researchers have alluded to the
notion that agency is applicable below the CEO and TMT level (Cruz et al., 2010;
Eisenhardt, 1989), the literature does not currently include employees at the lowest levels
of the organization. If the aggregate influence on agency cost is meaningful as predicted,
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then this will broaden the scope of how agency cost is assessed. Evaluating the cost of
agency at the employee level is especially critical, given the COVID-19 pandemic,
because approximately half of the workforce in the United States was granted the
tremendous autonomy to temporarily telecommute to work daily (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2020). The inability of managers to control the work environment of telecommuting
employees likely has a material influence on agency costs.
Third, this study attempts to demonstrate the nascent relationship between OLC
and CPO, as there are no current studies that examine this relationship directly. Pierce et
al. (2018) empirically tested a measure of group learning in relation to CPO, and it was
just above the threshold of statistical significance. However, by including the component
of culture into the measure, I anticipate finding a statistically significant relationship
between OLC and CPO. Moreover, an OLC may help a firm not only minimize agency
costs but also potentially increase a firm’s adaptability during changes in the broader
environment.
Finally, this study attempts to extend prior work on the measurement of agency
cost, by evaluating feelings of CPO and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Organizational (OCB-O) as inverse proximal indicators of agency cost. While the affect
of CPO may be an intense motivator, it is interesting to evaluate whether citizenship
behaviors directed towards the organization will manifest in tandem those intense
feelings. Not only are there numerous situations, where financial metrics on a privately
held company will be unavailable, but there are other firms and organizations this may
help pave the way for examination. If there is a meaningful inverse relationship between
both CPO and OCB-O and the measure for agency cost, this may open the door to extend
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the examining agency theory in organizations, where there may not be profit measure of
performance (e.g., asset utilization, expense ratio, Tobin’s Q, and ROA), and by using
CPO and OCB-O researchers may be able to measure the degree of agency cost within a
not-for-profit or governmental organization.

1.3 Summary of Remaining Chapters
This chapter introduces some of the challenges and opportunities in the agency,
CPO, and OLC literature. This chapter has also brought to light the problems with the
existing literature on agency theory, CPO, and OLC, and it identifies some of the
contributions the study sets out to make. Specifically, the attempt is to further integrate
agency theory and PO by examining this relationship at the collective level, endeavoring
to extend prior work by going beyond the CEO and TMT in analyzing agency costs,
examining the relationship between OLC and CPO, and attempting to extend prior work
to evaluate inverse proximal measure for agency costs, which can extend the relevance
beyond for-profit firms.
Chapter 2 Literature Review dives into the literature on agency theory and CPO,
and it will further unpack the problems with the current state of the literature, as well as
opportunities to address these problems. This chapter will also discuss the literature of the
antecedents and mediator, which set favorable conditions for an OLC, CPO, and OCB-O
to emerge. Chapter 3 Model and Hypotheses builds a conceptual model, which depicts
the path that the antecedent variables flow through an OLC leading to the two proposed
outcome variables above of CPO and OCB-O, which are inverse proxies for agency
costs. This chapter also articulates the hypothesized relationships between and among the
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variables in the model. Chapter 4 Methods articulates the characteristics of the sample,
the measures used, sources of data, statistical analysis used, and Chapter 5 Results
provides the details of the results of the hypothesized relationships laid out in Chapter 3.
The final chapter, Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusion, re-examines the problems
identified in Chapter 1, and it provides an overview of the major findings from the study.
Additionally, this chapter highlights the implications of the findings for both theory and
practice.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In the previous chapter, I enumerated four primary contributions this study sets
out to make. First, this study attempts to further integrate agency theory and
Psychological Ownership (PO) theory by examining this relationship at the collective
level. Second, this study sets out to extend agency theory beyond the CEO and TMT to
all members of the firm, and this is likely the cornerstone contribution of this work.
Third, this study seeks to examine the novel relationship between an Organizational
Learning Culture (OLC) and Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO), because CPO
has only been studied in relation to group learning, which may be diluted without the
additional component of organizational culture (Pierce et al., 2018). Finally, this study
sets out to extend prior work on agency theory by attempting to establish inverse
proximal measures for agency cost using the outcome variables of CPO and OCB-O. This
should open new avenues to research agency costs in other organizations than solely forprofit firms.
The subsections below examine the theoretical underpinnings for this discussion
and discuss the variables examined in a linear way. These following subsections attempt
to build the foundation for the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3, and to present the
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variables in a way that make it easy to visualize the conceptual model. To initiate this
discussion, it is helpful to first gain a better understanding of agency theory.

2.1 Agency Theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency relationship is a contract
between the firm owner, or principal, and the agent, who the principal empowers with
certain decision-making authority to fulfil a service on the principal’s behalf. For the
decade preceding this seminal work, the neoclassical model of the firm persisted, where
the firm offers a single product in a perfectly competitive market, and the sole purpose of
the firm is to maximize the profits within the same period, which is later revised in favor
of maximization of the present value of the firm (Anderson, 1982). Regardless of whether
the principal is more interested in maximizing the profits within the current period or
maximizing the present value of the firm, the principal’s interests are divergent from the
agent, and there are costs to the principal to ensure the agent will act in the principal’s
best interest, which are referred to as agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Panda and
Leepsa (2017) maintain that agency costs are the result of the principal and the agent both
engaging in self-interested pursuits, but there is a paradox in this relationship, as these
“self-interested parties also know that their interests can only be satisfied if the firm
exists” (p. 78-79).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there are three types of agency costs:
monitoring cost, bonding costs, and residual loss. Monitoring cost is the primary concern,
but bonding cost and residual loss are discussed as well for context. Monitoring costs are
the expenditures for the purpose of ensuring that the agent is engaging in the activities
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that align with the interest of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A good example
of monitoring cost is investing in an inventory management system, so the principal can
ensure that resources are being used optimally by keeping lean stocks of inventory and
turning inventory over regularly. On the other hand, bonding costs are expenditures to
ensure that the agent is unable to take certain actions unfavorable to the principal, and an
example of this is requiring a certified public accountant to audit the financial statements
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Alternatively, Panda and Leepsa (2017) maintain that
bonding costs are those associated with setting up and operating the firm. Finally, the
residual loss is simply the cost of the inefficient decisions of the agent, outside of
bonding costs and monitoring costs (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). However, as noted, the
primary focus is on monitoring costs, but first it is important to discuss the motivations
for the divergent interests between principal and agent.
These divergent interests between the principal and the agent arise for a variety of
reasons, but I address a few: information asymmetry, differing degrees of risk tolerance,
and limited earnings (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Information asymmetry occurs when the
agent has more timely and accurate information about the firm than the principal does,
which makes the principal reliant upon the agent for firm information, and the imbalance
may provide the opportunity for the agent to take actions unfavorable to the principal
(Dierkens, 1991). Additionally, while the agent may commit firm resources to somewhat
profitable projects, these projects may be suboptimal, because the agent may perceive the
projects to be personally less risky than other more profitable ones (Anderson, 1982).
Moreover, while the principal may seek profit maximization, the agent may seek to
maximize personal compensation, since agents have limited control over earnings, and
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both divergent motivations are self-interested (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Another issue
related to limited earnings is that the suboptimal investment decisions may also be the
result of satisficing, and this is when an agent decides upon seeing the first acceptable
option, rather than systematically looking for the most optimal solution (Bourgeois,
1981). The interest divergence between the executive and the firm owner generates
agency cost, but the problems associated with agency likely extends beyond top
management. It is important to point out here that the above discussion relates to Type I
agency problems discussed in chapter one, and these problems are centered around both
information asymmetry and non-mutual risk tolerance within the principal-agent
relationship.
Some argue that there are not agency costs when the firm manager is also the sole
firm owner (Ang et al., 2000), but even when there is perfect alignment of interest
between the firm owner and manager, as with a sole owner/manager, this does not
necessarily translate to maximum efficiency. Agency costs may even be present in these
firms as well (Lauterbach & Vaninsky, 1999). Much of the work on agency theory relates
specifically to the agent being a member of top management, but agency is also likely
applicable to employees at all echelons of an organization (Eisenhardt, 1989). Many
argue that the chief executive, as well as the top management team TMT, exert
substantial influence on firm performance (Mackey, 2008), and when these executives
are not firm owners, they serve as the focal point for studies about agency cost. While the
TMT and CEO, in many firms, likely have a disproportionate influence on firm
performance and agency cost, it is important to consider the potential collective influence
firm employees can have on agency costs.
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In many different roles within a firm, the employee is granted a certain degree of
autonomy to make minor decisions that can influence agency cost. For example, consider
a food service employee, working in the kitchen of a fast-food restaurant on the closing
shift. If that employee prepares more food than will be ordered, the employee will most
likely have to throw out the surplus food at closing. To put the magnitude of this one
example into perspective, some have argued that the global level of waste in the food
supply chain between 2010 and 2050 could feed as many as 9 billion people in one
setting (Parfitt et al., 2010). While this projection is based upon total waste in the food
supply chain a portion of this occurs in the restaurant by improper storage, careless
processing, and overproduction. While the mindset of the closing shift employee may be
to produce larger quantities of food in fewer batches, this overproduction translates to
increased agency cost (Christ & Burritt, 2017). It is important to point out that it is
probably not the owner or top manager making the routine decision of how much food to
prepare before closing, and this limited decision-making authority, by kitchen employees,
likely has a meaningful aggregate impact on the restaurant’s profitability influencing both
monitoring and residual agency costs (Panda & Leepsa, 2017).
The brief example above demonstrates how agency cost may not just be limited to
the CEO and TMT, because minor decisions made by employees may collectively
produce a noticeable influence on agency costs. Although a select few have been noted
here, there are numerous other causes of agency costs, but there also may be some
mitigating techniques that have alleviated these costs. One of the most powerful remedies
offered to mitigate the agency problem is for managers to share in an ownership stake in
the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, it would likely be cost prohibitive for
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every firm to restructure equity to an employee stock ownership plan, where every
employee has a legal interest in the success of the firm. On the other hand, it may be
possible to produce a context where employees feel an affective sense of collective
ownership (Pierce & Jussila, 2010) and behave in a manner more consistent with those
collective feelings of ownership (Lee & Allen, 2002). These feelings and behaviors may
help close the gap between principal and agent. Pierce and Jussila (2010) argue that
group learning is related to Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO) and even though
the relationship between CPO and group learning is measured slightly above the 0.05
level of statistical significance (Pierce et al., 2018), adding the component of culture to
organizational learning will likely create the favorable conditions for a meaningful
relationship. In the following three sub-sections, I address the three proposed antecedents
of an OLC: Organizational Identification (OID), an Innovation Climate (IC), and Team
Empowerment (TE).

2.2 Organizational Identification
OID is rooted in social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978). It argues that people tend to
associate their personal identities within the context of social groups (Trepte, 2006).
Membership within a social group provides an individual a sense of belongingness, and
these feelings of belonging often result in the development of a positive social identity,
which enhances self-esteem (Trepte, 2006). A social identity is a combination of the selfawareness of membership in various groups and the subjective emotional value
associated with those group memberships (Tajfel, 1978). However, this positive social
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identity is not just limited to social group identification, as that person may seek to find
an identity within the context of an organizational setting (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).
OID occurs when employees perceive an openness with the firm and feel a sense
of belonging and based on the degree of the positive affect towards the firm, employees
define themselves as members of the organization (He & Brown, 2013). He and Brown
(2013) note numerous subjective organizational factors that may enhance employees’
OID, and these factors may include the following: “attractiveness, distinctiveness,
prestige,” and “construed external image” (p. 14). For instance, the attractiveness
dimension shows how employees view the firm from an orderliness perspective, (i.e., is
the work environment always kept in a highly organized condition). Distinctiveness
relates to how perceptibly different the firm may be in relation to other firms in the
market or industry, from a service, selection, or price standpoint. Prestige relates to how
employees feel about the perceived degree of exclusivity the status is of being an
employee of the firm. Attractiveness, distinctiveness, and prestige may all be related to
the external image the firm projects. The bottom line is that employees are more likely to
identify with firms that help them enhance their individual self-image (He & Brown,
2013).
Employees also will identify with an organization when there is a perceived
congruence of values and interests between the employee and employer. These shared
values and interests can influence employees to feel a sense of shared investment in the
success of the organization (Miller et al., 2000). With this shared sense of personal
investment in the success of the firm, OID may also help reduce agency costs, because
OID improves the probability that employees will act in the best interest of the
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organization, whether or not supervision is present (Miller et al., 2000). Moreover,
Cheney (1983) argues that OID also improves employee “motivation, job satisfaction,
individual decision-making, role orientation and conflict, employee interaction, and
length of service” (p. 343), and these outcomes point to improved employee relations,
engagement, fulfillment, tenure, and decision-making, which are all likely aligned with
the best interest of the organization.
While the outcomes listed above are generally favorable to the organization, it
should be noted that they are all limited to in-role performance. However, some argue
that OID can lead to employees going the extra mile and engaging in extra-role behaviors
to the benefit of the firm, and these Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational
(OCB-O) are not required and not necessarily rewarded by the firm, even though they
may be encouraged (Van Dick et al., 2006). OID is shown above to influence employees
affect, in-role behavior, and extra-role behavior, but additionally, OID emerges when
there is a perception of shared values between the employee and employer, which may
pertain to learning behaviors associated with helping to solve organizational problems
(Miller et al., 2000).
Edmondson (1999) argues that group learning is “an ongoing process of reflection
and action, characterized by asking questions, seeking feedback, experimenting,
reflecting on results, and discussing errors or unexpected outcomes of actions” (p. 353).
There are a few things that need unpacking in this statement. First, the double use of the
word reflection indicates that great value is placed upon examining the factors
contributing to prior success. Second, asking questions and seeking feedback points to a
desire to seek understanding, as well as a recognition that internal knowledge and
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wisdom may be insufficient for future success. Finally, the willingness to discuss errors
and expected outcomes acknowledges that there is a certain degree of tolerance for trying
new ideas and processes, even when they do not yield the results anticipated.
Additionally, Chughtai and Buckley (2010) find that OID leads to the learning behaviors
of feedback seeking and error communication, but these learning behaviors may be
considered reactive. This transitions the discussion to an IC, which is more proactive and
is the second proposed antecedent of an OLC.

2.3 Innovation Climate
Innovation can be a powerful tool in organizations, because it relates to the
generation and implementation of new ideas or reconfiguration of both new and old ideas
(Van de Ven, 1986). Innovation may be formulated around new processes, which consists
of new techniques, approaches, or policies, but innovation may also be developed around
new technology, which consists of new tools, new equipment, or new products (Van de
Ven, 1986). Kanter (1988) maintains that there are four stages of innovation: idea
generation, coalition building, idea implementation, and knowledge transfer.
First, idea generation is usually the byproduct of problem recognition, where
someone acknowledges that there is an issue that needs to be resolved, and that individual
attempts to provide an acceptable solution, whether the solution be previously established
or completely new (Scott & Bruce, 1994). Second, oftentimes it is insufficient for the
solution to be widely accepted based upon the one person’s suggestion, and this involves
building a coalition with acceptable legitimate and referent power to transform the
solution from an idea into a concrete reality (Kanter, 1988). When implementing change
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at the organizational level, the importance of building a coalition must not be understated,
because resistance to change is very likely (Kotter, 1998). Third, when the coalition is
formed around the new or improved idea, the next task is idea implementation, and this is
indicative of the transformation of an abstract idea into something more concrete, like a
prototype, plan, or a model (Kanter, 1988). Finally, knowledge transfer or diffusion is the
final task, and this occurs when the knowledge is adopted and spread throughout the
organization (Kanter, 1988). These four tasks noted above lay out the process of
innovation, but what does innovation look like in the context of an organizational
climate?
An organizational climate requires a referent (i.e., safety, service, or
achievement), because there is not an omnibus climate within organizations (Schneider &
Reichers, 1983). Climate is based upon collective perceptions, and at the individual level,
climate is an individual interpretation of the situation within an organization (Scott &
Bruce, 1994). The primary referent of concern here is innovation, and organizations that
value innovation tend to encourage creativity, continuous improvement, and employee
empowerment to pursue novel ideas (Kanter, 1988). With an IC, firm members are
resourced, recognized, and rewarded for creativity, and an innovation climate is
characterized by the encouragement of the following: flexibility, adaptability, and
openness to change (Scott & Bruce, 1994). Additionally, an innovation climate sets
conditions for many favorable organizational outcomes to emerge.
First, by encouraging flexibility, adaptability, idea generation, and openness to
change (Scott & Bruce, 1994), an innovation climate sets the favorable conditions for an
OLC to emerge. Second, when an organization signals to employees that they value

22

innovative behaviors, employees develop covenantal ties to the organization, and this
drives employee behaviors towards creativity and innovation (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004).
This emotional connection with and associated behaviors towards the organization
indicates a relationship between an IC and CPO. Finally, Qadeer and Jaffery (2014) argue
that there is a positive relationship between an IC and OCB-O. It is now time to transition
the discussion to the final proposed antecedent of an OLC, TE.

2.4 Team Empowerment
TE is the third antecedent of an OLC, which is a team level analysis, and OID and
IC are at the individual and organizational level of analysis, respectively. When a firm
empowers employees to self-manage work teams, the performance of the teams improves
because these teams are responsible for assigning work tasks, scheduling, making some
limited decisions, as well as resolving personnel, process, and customer issues (Kirkman
& Shapiro, 1997). One key component of empowerment is delegating or relinquishing
authority to the team level. This can create an enhanced sense of collective control over
the workplace and processes (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999). However, Kirkman and Rosen
(1999) maintain that there are three other dimensions of team empowerment: potency,
meaningfulness, and impact.
First, potency is the general sense among the team members that the team
possesses the capability to perform at a high level, and this relates to a collective sense of
confidence in the skills, abilities, and productivity of the team (Kirkman et al., 2004).
This confidence, however, is not based on hubris, rather it is based upon feelings of team
productivity, effort, problem solving skills, and influence on other teams, which is often
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grounded in historical performance (Guzzo et al., 1993). Chen and Kanfer (2006) argue
that team efficacy, or the collective belief in the team’s ability, is a critical motivational
state for the team, because task accomplishment is more likely to be achieved when
teams believe in the probability of success, rather than the mere possibility of success.
However, additional motivators may be required, and this transitions the discussion to the
next dimension of TE, meaningfulness.
Meaningfulness connotes a collective sense among team members that their work
is intrinsically worthwhile, and empowerment creates a sense among workers that their
work is valuable (Seibert et al., 2011). Meaningfulness is a powerful motivator, because
it indicates a strong connection between the role at work and personal principles, values,
and standards (Seibert et al., 2011). Meaningfulness acknowledges that the work is not
only important to the individual team member, but it is important to the team as well.
Closely related to meaningfulness, impact is the perception that the output of the work
team is significant to the whole organization, but this is distinctive from meaningfulness,
since impact looks to the importance of the team’s work from the perspective of the total
organization and not just from the perspective of the team (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999). The
three dimensions of TE of potency, meaningfulness, and impact are all important, but as
noted earlier, autonomy is perhaps the most important dimension of TE, which transitions
the discussion to the final dimension of this construct.
Autonomy indicates the degree of freedom an organization grants a team to have
discretion over the team’s work, but it also indicates the degree of discretion the team has
for decision-making. Rowlands (1995) argues that empowerment brings employees
without decision-making authority into the decision-making process, and the key
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decision-making component of empowerment indicates that in the absence of autonomy,
it would be difficult for empowerment to exist. However, when the team is empowered,
there are several favorable organizational outcomes that may emerge.
First, some have demonstrated the empirical relationship between TE and
organizational learning by arguing that “empowerment is one of the important
characteristics of learning organizations” (Ravangard et al., 2014, p. 2). Second, Kirkman
and Rosen (1999) maintain that team empowerment leads to proactive behaviors, where
teams scan the environment for opportunities by “showing initiative, taking action and
solving problems, and persevering until changes are made,” (p. 62) and being proactive,
taking initiative, solving problems, and persevering are all indicative of a collective sense
of psychological ownership. Finally, empowerment at the individual level is shown to
lead to OCB-O (Ackfeldt & Coote, 2005), but it should be noted that this level of analysis
is individual empowerment leading to OCB-O, not testing TE leading to OCB-O. Now
that proposed antecedents of OID, IC, and TE have been discussed above, it is now time
to discuss the proposed mediator variable of OLC.

2.5 Organizational Learning Culture
Every organization learns – even if there is not a systematic process for doing so –
but learning alone is not necessarily indicative of a high level of performance (Basten &
Haamann, 2018). Consider how people learn about things they are afraid of, such as
touching the burner of a hot stove, and this example demonstrates that learning can occur
in a haphazard and experiential way. Intentional learning, at the organizational level, is
directed at improving organizational effectiveness, and Huber (1991) discusses four
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dimensions of organizational learning: knowledge acquisition, information distribution,
information interpretation, and organizational memory.
The first dimension of organizational learning is knowledge acquisition, and this
comes in a variety of forms, including learning through personal experience, through the
experience of others, and through knowledge inherited over the life of an organization
(Huber, 1991). Learning through the experiences of others is known as vicarious
learning, but some are critical of this form of learning, as organizations may draw
inaccurate inferences from the data (Denrell, 2003). Although experiential learning is
often unsystematic and unplanned, some experiential learning is highly structured and
deliberate, and organizational experiments provides this opportunity by analyzing
feedback (Huber, 1991). Regardless of what means are utilized by the organization,
Huber (1991) argues that “knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is
obtained” by the organization (p. 90). After the knowledge is acquired, the next
dimension of organizational learning addresses how the information is distributed.
Information distribution is the dissemination of information throughout the
organization, and information distribution precedes the interpretation of that information,
which helps turn information into useful knowledge (Fauske & Raybould, 2005). Huber
(1991) argues that information distribution is indicative of the degree of organizational
learning, based upon both the incidents of information dissemination, as well as how
widely the information is shared. In essence, the greater the degree of information
distribution, the greater the degree of organizational learning in a firm. As alluded to
earlier, the next dimension of organizational learning is information interpretation.
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Information interpretation may be thought of in terms of sensemaking, and Weick
(1993) articulates that sensemaking “is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from
efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs” (p. 636). This
creation of order Weick describes above helps place the information into a context to
provide a common or shared understanding among organization members (Huber, 1991).
Without this shared understanding, information is likely not as useful to the organization,
because different organization members, perhaps even departments, may draw different
inferences from the same information based upon an incomplete vantage point. This
transitions the discussion to organizational memory, which is the final dimension of
organizational learning.
What good is it for a firm to acquire, distribute, and interpret information, if it is
not captured and stored for future use? Organizational memory is a mechanism by which
knowledge acquired from past experience is applied by the firm to current operations, and
this memory bank helps reduce the time and resources required to tackle a present
challenge (Stein & Zwass, 1995). Organizational memory may be stored in the personal
memories of firm members, as well as on organizational information systems, and
organizational memory may be incrementally reduced as a result of employee turnover
(Huber, 1991). Now that the dimensions of organizational learning have been unpacked,
it is now time to address the cultural component of an OLC.
Culture includes an organizations artifacts or observable characteristic, values or
core organizational principles, and assumptions about how things should be done, and
Schein (2017) articulates that culture is a collective learning process, based upon
organizational values, to solve both internal and external problems. Therefore, culture
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includes the organizational values and assumptions about what should be done and how,
and it also includes the observable characteristics of organizational artifacts. Combining
organizational learning with culture, it is proposed that an OLC is defined as an
organizational system of shared beliefs that places great emphasis on the value of
learning, both conceptually and in practice, and these shared beliefs and values drive
organizational behaviors towards continual learning.

2.6 Collective Psychological Ownership
Agency costs arise due to divergent interest between the principal and the agent,
and one method proposed to align the interest of the principal and agent is granting shares
of stock to the agent, which makes the agent a principal as well (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). However, does granting shares of stock ownership automatically limit the
divergent interest, given that the agent did not invest personal capital to purchase the
shares of stock? There is a psychological component to ownership, beyond just a formal
legal interest, and these feelings of possessiveness may surface, even when the agent has
no legal ownership interest (Sieger et al., 2013). Agents who develop a sense of
ownership, when no formal interest exists, are referred to as “psychological principals”
(Pierce et al., 2003, p. 30), and there are three motivations that contribute to the concept
of PO at the individual level: efficacy and effectance, self-identity, and having a place.
First, efficacy refers to the desire to attain power and control, because possessions
can be instrumental in achieving or maintaining control of the environment, as well as
people within the environment (Pierce et al., 2003). Second, self-identity is an important
motivation, since possessions are symbolic extensions of the self, and identifying with
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targets of ownership, provide individuals with a way to define their self-identity (Pierce
et al., 2001). Finally, the concept of belongingness or having a place, which is briefly
discussed above, is characteristic of the way employees feel about home, because they
possess a need to have a place of refuge, a preferred space, or a home (Pierce et al.,
2003). PO is an affective state in which an individual feels that a target of ownership
belongs to the individual, and these feelings can be directed at the tangible, such as a
person, place, or thing, or the intangible, such as an idea or an organization (Pierce et al.,
2001). Just as an individual can experience feelings of ownership, without legal interest,
so can groups experience collective feelings of ownership, and “collective psychological
ownership is the collectively held sense (feeling) that this target of ownership (or a piece
of that target) is collectively ‘ours’ ” (Pierce & Jussila, 2010, p. 812).
CPO is a shared sense of possessiveness among firm employees that they
collectively own the firm, and the motivations at the collective level are very similar to
that of the individual level: identification, belongingness, and desire for control (Ng &
Su, 2018). Group identification is essentially viewing oneself as a member of the group,
and this motive stems from social identity theory (Pierce et al., 2018). At the collective
level, belongingness is articulated as a shared sense of hardship endurance, and this
emphasizes not only having a home but also a shared commitment to the organization
(Ng & Su, 2018). Finally, the desire for control is measured as the degree to which
organization members are involved in decision-making for the firm (Ng & Su, 2018).
Pierce and Jussila (2010) argue in favor of the relationship between CPO and both
group learning and psychological safety, but it should be noted that group learning and
psychological safety only demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with CPO at
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the 0.10 level (Pierce et al., 2018). Psychological safety indicates the degree of comfort
an individual has for sharing ideas and taking risks within the organization, and this
concept is very similar to an IC (Pierce et al., 2018). However, the authors used
Edmondson’s (1999) seven item scale to measure both group learning and psychological
safety (Pierce et al., 2018), and measuring an IC and an OLC in a more comprehensive
manner using two separate scales will likely improve the statistical significance (Scott &
Bruce, 1994; Yang, 2003).

2.7 Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB) are actions taken outside of an
employee’s role, and Organ (1988), in the title of his book on OCB, aptly describes this
phenomenon as the “good soldier syndrome.” These behaviors are acts of helpfulness and
kindness, but while the behaviors might be conflated with cooperation, the original
dimensions include the following: punctuality, helpfulness, innovativeness, and
efficiency (Smith et al., 1983). Organ (1988) further develops the concept of OCB by
noting that the helpful behavior is discretionary for which no formal reward system
provides acknowledgment, and these helpful behaviors encourage greater organizational
efficiency and effectiveness. It should be noted that the early measures looked at both
helpfulness towards individuals within the organization, as well as helpfulness and
goodwill towards the organization itself, but these measures are now further delineated to
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Individual (OCB-I) and Organizational Citizenship
Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), respectively (Podsakoff et al., 2000).
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Organ (1988) articulates five dimensions of OCB, and they are as follows:
altruism, courtesy, conscientiousness, civic virtue, and sportsmanship. Altruism is a
general sense of goodwill towards the organization and coworkers, and this is manifested
behaviorally by a general sense of helpfulness (Podsakoff et al., 2000). Courtesy is
another dimension of helpfulness, and this involves proactively addressing issues, so that
they do not cause problems for coworkers (Podsakoff et al., 2000). Conscientiousness is
described in the vein of organizational compliance, and this may involve being at work
on time, avoiding counterproductive activities, and generally following the organizational
rules (Podsakoff et al., 2009).
On the other hand, civic virtue involves employees taking a keen interest in the
life of the organization, and civic virtue includes staying abreast on the goings on within
one’s own department, as well as maintaining situational awareness about what is going
on within the broader organization (Podsakoff et al., 2009). Finally, sportsmanship occurs
when an employee is more likely to endure less than ideal conditions, without vocalizing
complaints, and this falls in line with Organ’s (1988) description of the good soldier.
However, it is important to isolate citizenship behaviors specifically directed towards the
organization.
There are numerous characteristics of OCB-O, and some include attending
organizational functions and staying current on what is happening in the other functional
areas within the organization (Lee & Allen, 2002). Additionally, this may involve
showing pride in the organization and defending the organization, when others criticize
the firm, and these behaviors are generally indicative of loyalty to the organization (Lee
& Allen, 2002). Moreover, these behaviors may include offering unsolicited, innovative
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solutions to organizational problems, as well as proactively attempting to address issues
before they impact the organization, and these may also include feelings that demonstrate
a generalized concern for the image of the organization (Lee & Allen, 2002). OCB-O is
defined here as unrewarded behaviors that encourage the general welfare of the
organization by promoting and defending the organization, as well as innovating and
problem solving on behalf of the organization.
In the next chapter, the hypotheses will be unpacked, enumerating the
relationships among these variables. First, this study will explore CPO in an attempt to
further integrate agency theory and PO theory. Second, this study will evaluate how
agency theory is applicable to all members of the firm, rather than exclusively at the CEO
and TMT level. Third, this study will evaluate the novel relationship between OLC and
CPO, because this relationship has only been evaluated by looking at group learning,
which is distinctive from an OLC (Pierce et al., 2018). Finally, this study attempts to
extend prior work on agency theory by establishing inverse proximal measures for
agency cost using the outcome variables of CPO and OCB-O.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

The preceding chapter unpacked agency theory, Collective Psychological
Ownership (CPO), Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), along
with three antecedents and a mediator variable. This chapter presents a conceptual model
and develops hypotheses for testing the proposed direct and indirect relationships among
the variables. Below is a brief recap on agency theory, which can help a firm explain the
behavior of agents, and the term agent is simply defined here as all non-owner employees
of a firm, which is an expanded definition including managerial firm employees at all
levels and non-managerial firm employees.
As previously highlighted, Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss the agency
relationship as one between the owner (principal) and firm manager (agent), and this
relationship is a contract between the principal and agent, where the agent is granted
certain decision-making authority to provide a service on behalf of the principal. This is
the rudimentary Type I form of agency, and the problems associated with this form of
agency primarily deal with information asymmetry and non-mutual risk tolerance within
the principal-agent relationship (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Although agency theory is
evaluated primarily at the CEO or TMT level, it is proposed here that agency is
applicable to employees at all echelons of an organization, and this is the primary reason

33

for the expanded definition of agent above (Eisenhardt, 1989). Referencing back to the
first research question it is proposed that every supervisor in an organization is both a
principal and an agent, and every employee of the firm is an agent. Looking back to the
second research question in the absence of legal ownership interest, it is proposed that
employees who develop a sense of CPO and engage in OCB-O will feel and behave like
firm principals, which will reduce agency costs. The hypotheses below will be tested at
all echelons of the firm from the TMT to the line employees.
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Figure 1. Structural Model Showing the Relationships of the Variables and Corresponding Hypotheses. This structural model
displays the relationships among the variables. Organizational Learning Culture (OLC) mediates the positive relationships
between the antecedent variables of Organizational Identification (OID), Innovation Climate (IC), and Team Empowerment (TE)
with the favorable organizational outcomes of Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO) and Organizational Citizenship
Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O).

3.1 Model and Hypotheses
This section discusses the relationships among the variables and the
corresponding hypotheses, and Figure 1 depicts the conceptual model of these
relationships. There are numerous empirical studies about Organizational Identification
(OID), but these studies tend to focus on relationships with outcome variables associated
with attitudes, behaviors, and organizational context (Riketta, 2005). Affective
organizational commitment is often evaluated as an outcome variable in relation to OID,
but only a few studies examine organizational learning or an OLC preceding the affective
commitment outcome (Malik & Garg, 2017). An organization member demonstrates
affective organizational commitment by working hard for the firm, buying into the firm’s
goals, and strongly desiring to continue working for the firm (Mowday et al., 1979). One
meta-analysis notes that some OID scales do not demonstrate empirical distinction from
affective organizational commitment (Riketta, 2005), but this study will use the Mael and
Tetrick (1992), which demonstrates discriminant validity when compared with affective
organizational commitment. Prior to the Riketta (2005) meta-analysis, Van Dyne and
Pierce (2004) compare affective organizational commitment to Psychological Ownership
(PO), because they note that the constructs are similar enough to merit discriminant
validity analysis. Looking at the components of affective commitment above, it appears
that CPO may be a more extreme version of affective commitment, and the relationship
between OID and affective commitment may be mediated through learning or an OLC, as
some have discussed learning as a determinant of OID.
One study links OID to behaviors associated with organizational learning, and
these include monitoring and feedback seeking behaviors (Chughtai & Buckley, 2010).
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Monitoring both the internal and external environment is indicative of organizational
learning, as firms with an OLC stress the importance of acquiring information, and then
turning that information into usable knowledge through accurate interpretation (Škerlavaj
et al., 2007). Additionally, feedback seeking is related to the organizational learning
characteristic of self-appraisal and double-loop learning, because when organizations
seek to solve non-routine problems, they are required to engage in constant reexamination to ensure they remain on azimuth (Huber, 1991). Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 1 – Organizational Identification is positively related to an
Organizational Learning Culture.
In evaluating the antecedents of an OLC, it is helpful to also consider the climate
for innovation in firms, because in the extensive work on organizational learning, Huber
(1991) argues that adaptation and innovation are both crucial for organizations in a
quickly evolving environment. Kanter (1988) argues in favor of four stages of
innovation: idea generation, coalition building, idea implementation, and knowledge
transfer. However, it is arguable that an organization may not ever get to the three final
stages of coalition building, idea implementation, and knowledge transfer in the absence
of an organizational climate fostering the generation of innovation and creativity.
Scott and Bruce (1994) maintain that innovation is related to “the production or
adoption of useful ideas and idea implementation” (p. 581), and at the individual level,
climate is a perception of an organizational situation with respect to a specific referent. In
this situation, the referent is innovation, and when an Innovation Climate (IC) exists,
organization members are recognized, rewarded, and resourced for creativity.
Additionally, an IC is characterized by the encouragement of organizational flexibility,

37

adaptability, and openness to change (Scott & Bruce, 1994), and all three of these
characteristics are indicative of learning. Both flexibility and adaptability signal a
willingness to change course, because there are things beyond the scope of the firm’s
control, as the broader environment does have an influence. The firm’s willingness to
change and adapt to the environment or context indicates at least a limited tolerance to try
new or different things, which is also indicative of learning, and it is posited that when
creativity is recognized, resourced, and rewarded, favorable conditions exist for an OLC
to emerge. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 2 – Innovation Climate is positively related to an Organizational
Learning Culture.
There are a number of things to consider when evaluating antecedents of an OLC,
and thus far this study has identified OID and an IC. However, another factor that merits
consideration is the degree of autonomy or empowerment the firm grants to work teams.
Kirkman and Shapiro (1997) find that autonomous or self-managed work teams perform
at a high level, because the key component is the firm delegating or empowering the
work team to exert limited control over the work environment. The organization granting
work teams autonomy is the center of gravity for Team Empowerment (TE), but Kirkman
and Rosen (1999) maintain there are three additional dimensions of TE: potency,
meaningfulness, and impact. Potency refers to a collective belief in the team’s ability to
succeed, and meaningfulness and impact refer to the significance of the team work to the
individuals on the work team and the organization, respectively (Kirkman & Rosen,
1999).
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Empowerment and delegation both express the connotation of limited decisionmaking, and while a team may only be given minor discretion in decisions, decisionmaking tends to involve a trial-and-error learning process (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999).
These decisions involve employee assignments, work schedules, service and production
processes, and resolution of customer and employee issues (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999).
While there may be historical data for these teams to base decisions upon, new personnel,
contexts, and environments may force a team to engage in learning processes. Some have
demonstrated the empirical relationship between TE and organizational learning by
arguing that “empowerment is one of the important characteristics of learning
organizations,” and it improves individual employee job performance, satisfaction,
motivation, and productivity (Ravangard et al., 2014, p. 2). Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 3 – Team Empowerment is positively related to an Organizational
Learning Culture.
Organizational learning involves knowledge acquisition, information distribution,
information interpretation, and organizational memory (Huber, 1991), and culture
includes an organization’s artifacts or observable characteristic, values or core
organizational principles, and assumptions about how things should be done (Schein,
2017). OLC is defined here as an organizational system of shared beliefs that places great
emphasis on the value of learning, both conceptually and in practice, and these shared
beliefs and values drive organizational behaviors towards continual learning. Although it
appears logical that as an organization learns more, they will collectively assume greater
responsibility and take ownership of the organizational systems, processes, and
procedures, but there are no current studies that examine the relationship between OLC
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and CPO. However, some have examined the relationship between group learning and
CPO.
Pierce and Jussila (2010) first proposed the concept of CPO, and in this seminal
work on CPO, they identified the relationship between CPO and group learning, as well
as CPO and psychological safety. However, they later empirically tested these
propositions, but the relationships were only statistically significant at the 0.10 level
(Pierce et al., 2018). It should be noted that both group learning and psychological safety
were measured using the Edmondson (1999) seven item scale, and while group learning
and psychological safety are related, there are distinctions. However, if a more
comprehensive scale for organizational learning is used, including a component of
culture, then it is posited that OLC will demonstrate a meaningful relationship with CPO,
both in magnitude and statistical significance. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 4 – An Organizational Learning Culture is positively related to
Collective Psychological Ownership.
OID also demonstrates a relationship with an OLC, as well as CPO. There are
three primary motives for Psychological Ownership (PO) at the individual level, which
are efficacy, self-identity, and having a place (Pierce & Jussila, 2010). It is important to
note that social identification is a crucial influence on CPO (Pierce & Jussila, 2010). In
fact, CPO has been defined as “people’s perception that an object, place, or idea belongs
to their own group,” and this suggests that identification with a group is a pre-requisite
for CPO to emerge (Storz et al., 2020, p. 404). However, the proposed relationship
between OID and CPO is not direct, and it must be mediated through an OLC.
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Committing to culture of continuous learning in an organization is no small task,
because inertia or the force to hold all variables constant is powerful (Becker, 1995). In
addition to resistance to change, committing to an OLC requires tremendous personal and
collective investment of time and energy, but some have noted that when individuals
invest time and energy to contribute to the development of creative processes, they are
more likely to both identify with the organization and feel a sense of ownership
(Giordano et al., 2020). This indicates that an OLC facilitates the relationship between
OID and CPO. Moreover, in some measurements of OID, items are included that indicate
both organizational learning and CPO, such as “in general, I view [the company]’s
problems as my problems” (Miller et al., 2000, p. 631). Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 5 – An Organizational Learning Culture mediates the positive
relationship between Organizational Identification and Collective Psychological
Ownership.
In addition to OID, an innovation climate also shows an indirect relationship with
CPO. Innovation relates to both the creation of new ideas and reconfiguration of existing
ideas (Van de Ven, 1986), and as noted, there are four stages in innovation: idea
generation, coalition building, idea implementation, and knowledge transfer (Kanter,
1988). However, in the absence of idea generation, it is hard to imagine the remaining
stages of innovation occurring within the firm, and it is asserted here that idea generation
is center of gravity for innovation. An organizational climate, on the other hand, is a
collectively perceived interpretation of the situation within an organization (Scott &
Bruce, 1994). An IC, in general terms, refers to a collectively perceived organizational
situation, where team members feel as though they are recognized, resourced, and
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rewarded to solve the organization’s problems, and an innovation climate indicates that
the organization is flexible, adaptable, and open to change (Scott & Bruce, 1994).
When an organization encourages flexibility, adaptability, idea generation, and
openness to change, this IC establishes advantageous conditions for an OLC to develop
(Scott & Bruce, 1994). By fostering a climate of innovation, the firm signals to team
members that change is necessary and new ideas are welcome, and when the firm
encourages idea generation, they are also encouraging knowledge acquisition, which is
the first dimension of organizational learning (Huber, 1991). Through the continuous
investment of time and energy to learn new ways of improving the firm with an OLC, a
sense of CPO begins to emerge, because team members feel their investment is
meaningful and valuable to the organization (Giordano et al., 2020). Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 6 – An Organizational Learning Culture mediates the positive
relationship between Innovation Climate and Collective Psychological
Ownership.
It is hypothesized above that both OID and an IC demonstrate an indirect
relationship with CPO, as mediated through an OLC, but the third antecedent of an OLC,
Team Empowerment (TE), is also proposed to have an indirect relationship with CPO.
Empowerment is shown to lead employees to engage in proactive behaviors, by scanning
the environment to solve problems, and this is indicative of PO (Kirkman & Rosen,
1999). In fact, Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) argue that “creating and maintaining work
settings that empower individuals and enable them to exercise control over important
aspects of their work arrangement should – we would argue – enhance their sense of
ownership” (p. 529). Stated differently, when individuals are provided guidance on what
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the desired end state looks like and are provided parameters of their left and right limits,
these individuals are empowered in a meaningful way. This empowerment is likely to
instill a durable sense of commitment or PO towards the organization. While the
argument for this is at the individual employee level, it is posited to extend to the
collective level of analysis, as mediated through an OLC.
As discussed, when a firm has an OLC, they display a system of shared beliefs
that places great emphasis on the value of learning, both conceptually and in practice,
these shared beliefs and values are posited to drive organizational behaviors towards
continual learning. Kirkman and Rosen (1999) maintain that empowerment leads to the
proactive behaviors for scanning the internal and external environment, which is
indicative of PO, but these behaviors are also indicative of a culture of continuous
learning. Although very few empirical tests have been performed, one research team find
that there is a relationship between empowerment and organizational learning (Ravangard
et al., 2014). Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 7 – An Organizational Learning Culture mediates the positive
relationship between Team Empowerment and Collective Psychological
Ownership.
Transitioning from effect of CPO to behavior, an OLC is also posited to have a
direct relationship with OCB-O. OCB were originally conceptualized as employees
exhibiting the behaviors of punctuality, helpfulness, innovativeness, and efficiency
(Smith et al., 1983), and in the title of his book, Organ (1988) provides an analogy of an
employee exhibiting OCB as having the “good soldier syndrome.” These helpful
behaviors are completely discretionary, in that they are not part of the official duty
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requirements, but Podsakoff et al. (2000) delineates the difference between OCB directed
towards individuals (OCB-I) or towards the organization OCB-O, which is of particular
interest here.
A firm with an OLC values learning by encouraging and rewarding the learning
process, and one of the items measuring OCB-O is that employees “offer ideas to
improve the functioning of the organization” (Lee & Allen, 2002, p. 142). This is broad
enough to encompass both the innovation to improve existing processes or the
encouragement of developing new systems, processes, services, and products.
Additionally, Somech and Drach-Zahavy (2004) empirically tested the relationship
between an organizational learning mechanisms and OCB-O, and they found that
organizational learning mechanisms predict OCB-O. Even though the aspect of culture is
not included in the measure, it is proposed that the positive directional relationship exists
from an OLC to OCB-O. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 8 – An Organizational Learning Culture is positively related to
Organizational Citizenship Behavior Organizational.
In addition to the direct relationship between OLC and OCB-O, indirect
relationships are proposed between each of the antecedent variables and OCB-O, as
mediated through an OLC. He and Brown (2013) argue that OID can lead to numerous
favorable organizational outcomes, including OCB-O, and the degree of OID influences
the eagerness of team members to apply additional effort towards improving work tasks
and the organization as a whole. The relationship between OID and OCB-O appears to be
indirect, because an OLC encourages employees to improve the organization by
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promoting “openness, creativity, and experimentation among members” (Odor, 2019, p.
4). Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 9 – An Organizational Learning Culture mediates the positive
relationship between Organizational Identification and Organizational Citizenship
Behavior Organizational.
There is also proposed to be an indirect relationship between an IC and OCB-O,
as mediated through an OLC. Qadeer and Jeffery (2014) maintain that there is a
relationship between IC and OCB-O, and they argue that this relationship may be
indirect. An IC, as noted above, is characterized by the encouragement of organizational
flexibility, adaptability, and openness to change (Scott & Bruce, 1994), and all three of
these characteristics are indicative of learning, which indicates a direct relationship with
an OLC. Moreover, Somech and Drach-Zahavy (2004) find that there is a direct
relationship between organizational learning mechanisms and OCB-O. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 10 – An Organizational Learning Culture mediates the positive
relationship between Innovation Climate and Organizational Citizenship Behavior
Organizational.
TE is the final proposed antecedent of an OLC, and TE is also proposed to have
an indirect relationship with OCB-O, as mediated through and OLC. Ackfeldt and Coote
(2005) contend that empowerment is perhaps the most important predictor of citizenship
behaviors, and of all the predictors of citizenship behaviors they studied, empowerment is
the most meaningful. Employees are also more likely to engage in OCB-O when the firm
provides avenues for growth and learning opportunities, which is indicative of an OLC
(Ackfeldt & Coote, 2005). Finally, the direct relationship between CPO and OCB has
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been empirically tested (Pierce et al., 2018), and there is a partially mediated relationship
between an OLC and OCB-O through CPO, as the direct relationship is enumerated in
Hypothesis 8. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 11 – An Organizational Learning Culture mediates the positive
relationship between Team Empowerment and Organizational Citizenship
Behavior Organizational.
Hypothesis 12 – Collective Psychological Ownership is positively related to
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational.
Hypothesis 13 – Collective Psychological Ownership mediates the relationship
between an Organizational Learning Culture and Organizational Citizenship
Behaviors Organizational.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS

The content of this chapter includes the process and actions used for testing the
hypotheses presented in the prior chapter, and there are multiple sections to this chapter.
The first section outlines the sources of the data for this study, as well as the sample size
required for analysis. The second section addresses the intent for collecting data, as well
as the instruments used in the survey. The third section details the sample collected in the
study. The fourth section includes how the data are coded for analysis. The fifth section
articulates the methods used to analyze the measurement of the variables, including
determining reliability and validity, but this section also analyzes the testing of
hypotheses.

4.1 Sample Criteria and Data Sources
Several research design considerations are needed to perform this study. The
initial consideration is the access needed to gather data from individuals representing
these firms. First, the sample needs to include both sole owner/managed firms, as well as
firms with separated ownership and management. If agency problems do in fact exist in
firms with a sole owner/manager, then agency may be applicable to every tier of
management, since every manager may wear both hats of principal and agent, and this
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may be due to the fact that agents demonstrate the ability to act as though they have a
formal ownership interest in the firm and behave as a psychological principal (Sieger et
al., 2013). Second, the sample needs to include firms where the top manager is accessible
for data collection regarding the presence or absence of agency costs in the firm. It is
estimated that the accessibility of the top manager may be proportionate to the size of the
firm, with the managers of smaller firms being more accessible, but it is noted that some
argue that larger firm have better response rates among top management than smaller
firms (Bartholomew & Smith, 2006). Third, the sample respondents need to have a small
to moderate degree of decision-making autonomy, which has the potential to generate
agency costs to the firm. For this reason, the sample focuses on the businesses with direct
interaction with customers in general and food service, because the minimal autonomy of
individual team members characteristic of the service businesses is posited to have a
meaningful influence on agency costs in aggregate. Although training is identified as a
potential mitigant to unnecessary product costs in restaurants, employee decisions can
influence these costs (Ramdeen et al., 2007). Finally, it is essential to be able to access
the employee population of both managers, at all levels, and team members, because this
will provide insight on whether agency exists within every manager-subordinate
relationship. Given the criteria above, the sample of firms likely needs to be smaller
businesses having direct interaction with customers, because they are relatively small in
number of employees and/or small in revenue size, even as some note that firm size
characteristics are not consistent predictors of responsiveness (Gupta et al., 2000).
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4.1.1 Data Sources
The firm data collection period took place between October 2021 through
February 2022 in two, time-separated survey waves. The sample consists of six for-profit
firms in the central Alabama area. These firms are considered small businesses, most
with revenue less than $10 million annually and most without a formal or informal board
of directors or collection of advisors. Firms with social ties to the researcher are also
shown to positively influence the survey response rate, and it should be noted that all firm
principals are familiar to the researcher in either a social or professional sense
(Bartholomew & Smith, 2006). Many of these firms have a sole owner/manager, who
will provide empirical testing for the presence of agency costs within this type of firm.
Additionally, when discussing the data sources, it is also important to consider the size of
the sample.
4.1.2 Sample Size
It is crucial to begin the process with the estimated end result in mind, and it is
important to determine significance criteria, desired effect size, and power required prior
to the data being collected (Cohen, 1992). The significance criteria or α is indicative of
the acceptable likelihood that the analyzed coefficient is different than zero when it is
not, and stated differently, it “denotes the chance the researcher is willing to take of being
wrong about whether the estimated coefficient is different from zero,” which indicates a
Type I error (Hair et al., 2019, p. 301). Most commonly researchers use the 0.05 level of
significance, while it is not uncommon to see the more stringent 0.01 level, but in
exploratory studies, it has been acceptable to use the more liberal 0.10 level (Cohen,
1992). This study will analyze the data at the more flexible 0.10 level of significance,
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given the exploratory nature of this study, and this transitions the discussion to the
desired effect size.
The symbol f 2 is referred to as the effect size, and this represents the change in
R2, which is the correlation coefficient squared or the coefficient of determination (Hair
et al., 2019). R2 is perhaps the most highly utilized metric to evaluate structural models,
and the coefficient of determination demonstrates the predictive power within the model,
indicating the likelihood that the independent variables will predict the dependent
variable (Hair et al., 2017). Finally, power indicates the likelihood of rejecting the null
hypothesis, when it is in fact false, and failure to reject a false null hypothesis is Type II
error (Cohen, 1992). Given the three independent variables leading to the mediator
variable in the proposed model, assuming a significance level of 0.10, a moderate R2 of
.25, and a statistical power of .80, the minimum acceptable sample size in PLS SEM is 30
(Hair et al., 2017, p. 26).
The for-profit firms listed in the data sources above have an employee population
of approximately 216, and it is estimated that a sample size of 108 participants is
attainable. Although a 50% response rate is very ambitious, there are three actions which
will be used to influence the response rate: owner’s endorsement, pre-notification, and
follow up (Sheehan, 2001; Yammarino et al., 1991). First, as part of the pre-notification,
the owner or firm manager will provide the employees a notification that they will
receive an email requesting participation in a research project, and the owner or firm
manager will encourage the participation in the survey. Second, the researcher will send
out a pre-notification to the employees detailing the timeline of the survey waves,
providing estimated participation time investment, and providing the justification for why
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the subject is very important, as this speaks to the salience of the subject matter at hand
(Sheehan, 2001). Finally, the researcher will send out follow up emails to encourage
employees to participate in the study, because follow up appeals are shown to improve
the response rates for both mail and electronic surveys (Sheehan, 2001; Yammarino et al.,
1991).
Surveys were sent to twenty businesses, and of the six businesses that participated
in both survey waves, the final sample size was 39 respondents or N = 39. Within those
six organizations, there were 216 potential respondents, and the survey participation rate
was 18%. Among these participants 33.3% were in supervisory roles, and 66.7% of the
respondents were non-supervisory in nature. It was anticipated to have a higher
participation rate within service businesses, but 72% of respondents came from the more
heavily regulated banking industry, with less than 15% coming from service businesses.
Most of the respondents, 84.6% work full-time, meaning they work at least 40 hours
weekly, and only 10.4% of respondents work less than 40 hours weekly. Of the
respondents, 50% have worked at the company for 11 years or fewer years, and the
remainder have 12 to 39 years of tenure at their respective firms. The sample consists of
59% female participants and 41% male participants, and respondent racial demographics
are as follows: 89.7% White, 7.7% Black or African American, and 2.6% Asian.
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Table 1. Demographic Information of the Survey Respondents
Sample Demographics
Industry
Percentage Education
Banking/Insurance/Finance
71.8% Some High School
Government Contracting
10.3% High School
Manufacturing
5.1% Trade School
Legal/Accounting/Professional Services
5.1% Some College
Hospitality/Restaurant
5.1% Associate Degree
Convenience Stores
2.6% Bachelor's Degree
Tenure Years
11 or Fewer
12 to 20
21 to 39

Percentage
50.0%
33.6%
15.6%

Sex
Male
Female

Percentage Supervisory Role
41.0% Supervisory Role
59.0% Non-Supervisory Role

Percentage
2.6%
17.9%
5.1%
20.5%
41.0%
12.8%

Hours Worked Percentage
20 or Fewer
5.2%
21 to 39
5.2%
40
56.4%
41 to 50
25.6%
Greater Than 50
2.6%
Other
5.0%

Race
Percentage
White
89.7%
Black or African American
7.7%
Asian
2.6%
Percentage
33.3%
66.7%

4.2 Data Collection Strategy
The data collection was proposed to take place in two survey waves to firm
employees, time-separated by 1 month for both conceptual and methodological reasons.
The third survey wave was solely for firm principals, top managers, or non-owner
financial employees, and these were sent following the close of the second survey wave
to employees. It should be noted that there was not a time period between the
observations of the proposed antecedent variables and proposed mediator variable of
Organizational Identification (OID), Innovation Climate (IC), Team Empowerment (TE),
and Organizational Learning Culture (OLC). Additionally, the literature does not
establish a clear estimate for the length of time after an OLC forms for employees to gain
a sense of Collective Psychological Ownership or CPO, as well as for employees to begin
engaging in Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O) (Ployhart &
Ward, 2011). These relationships are exploratory in nature. The progression from the
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antecedents and the mediator towards a CPO and OCB-O may occur at varying rates
among different organizations, but it was posited that the relationship between the
mediator variable and dependent variables are likely to manifest within one month of
collecting data on the antecedents and mediator variables. Additionally, from a
methodological standpoint, the employees responding to the surveys about the
antecedents and mediator were the same employees responding to the surveys about
outcome variables and given that the information on both will be coming from common
sources, it is important to mitigate the impact of common methods bias by timeseparating the measurements (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
The first phase of data collection involved contacting decision makers in forprofit companies, and it is noted that the sample was comprised of a combination
approach of both a purposive and convenience sample, which may limit the
generalizability of the results due to selection bias (Hair et al., 2015). However, this
sampling approach has been shown to have comparable results with population-based
sampling (Mullinix, et al., 2015). In the second phase, the emails of employees were
requested from the employers, but for firms whose owner/manager prefers to serve as the
intermediary, the surveys are sent through the owner/manager to be relayed to employees.
It should be highlighted that while some of the employers provided email addresses for
their employees, the highest response rate of 47% came from a community bank, where
the CEO made multiple appeals to employees to participate. The third phase involved
sending out a pre-notification email a week prior to sending the first survey, which
provided the employees of the firm with an alert to the upcoming survey. This pre-
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notification email also included a general discussion about the importance of the firm’s
culture and how their participation will be very important to the research project.
A week after the pre-notification email, the fourth phase began with sending out
the first wave of surveys, and this first wave measured the antecedent variables of OID,
IC, TE, and the mediator variable OLC. The link to participate in the survey remained
active for one month, and two follow up email notifications were sent during the month
in the attempt to maximize participation in the first survey wave. Upon completion of the
survey, the participants were asked to generate a unique reference code for the survey, so
that their individual second wave responses could be matched with the first, without
compromising anonymity. This first survey wave collection period occurred between
October 31 and November 30, 2021. There was an approximately 30-day interval
between the completion of phase four, and the beginning of phase five.
Phase five began with the submission of the pre-notification email to all firm
owner/managers and participants, and this pre-notification email was sent out 48 hours
prior to the second wave of surveys to employees. Phase six began when the second wave
of surveys was sent out to participants, which included the measures of CPO and OCB-O,
and as with phase four, the participants were sent two follow up email notifications in
order to maximize participation in the second wave of survey. Phase six ended one month
after the second wave of surveys were sent. This was the last phase for employee
participation in the study, which shifted the focus towards the firm principal, top
manager, or non-owner financial employee. The second survey wave to employees
occurred between January 01 and February 01, 2022.
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Phase seven began with the submission of a third survey wave, exclusively to the
principal, top manager, or non-owner financial employee. This survey attempted to gather
general information about the firm’s performance assessment in relation to firm peers,
and these more objective performance measures were to assess firm performance over
time. Firm performance, specifically return on assets, has been historically used to
indicate the presence of agency costs, and it is proposed that using performance measures
will serve as a proximal indicator of agency (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Given the assertion
that both CPO and OCB-O are inverse proximal indicators of Agency Costs, it was
anticipated that this phase would demonstrate that relationship. Where agency costs were
lower, as indicated by a measure of firm performance, the corresponding measures of
CPO and OCB-O were assumed to be higher, and vice versa.

4.2.1 Survey Instruments
There were several survey instruments proposed for use in this study, and there were
three waves of surveys as indicated above, with two being sent to employees and one to
the principal, top manager, or non-owner financial employee. The first wave to firm
employees included measures for OID, IC, TE, and OLC, and the second wave to firm
employees included measures for an CPO, and OCB-O. The third and final survey wave
was sent to the principal or top manager to gather information about firm performance,
and this survey was particularly interested in the firm’s general performance and return
on assets over time, which is an indicator of agency costs (Panda & Leepsa, 2017).
In the first survey wave to firm employees, OID was measured by a 10-item scale,
and among other things, this scale measures an employee’s feeling of identification with
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and membership of the subject firm (Mael & Tetrick, 1992). These 10 items are rated by
the employees on a scale between 1 – Strongly Disagree to 5 – Strongly Agree, as used
by Prati and Zani (2013). There were no modifications to the original scale, and the
numeric values between 1 and 5 remained the same as the previously validated scale.
This scale was used in place of the OID Questionnaire over concerns with empirical
distinctions between Affective Organizational Commitment, and Riketta (2005)
recommends using the scale above.
The second scale used in the first survey wave was the 22-item scale for
measuring an IC, and these items address the behavioral manifestations for how much a
firm values innovativeness (Scott & Bruce, 1994). There are three overarching behavioral
themes in the survey items, and these are concerned with whether a firm resources,
recognizes, and rewards innovative behaviors. The items were not modified from the
originally validated measure, and they are on a scale from 1 – Not At All to 5 – To An
Exceptional Degree (Scott & Bruce, 1994).
The third scale used in the first survey wave was the 12-item scale for measuring
TE, and these items relate to the perception of the team or workgroup’s sense of potency,
meaningfulness, autonomy, and impact (Kirkman et al., 2004). These items were
originally constructed on a Likert type scale between 1 – To No Extent and 5 – To a
Great Extent (Guzzo et al., 1993), but the measures were re-validated to a Likert type
scale from 1 – Strongly Disagree to 7 – Strongly Agree by Kirkman et al. (2004). The
referent was modified in the scale to team/workgroup from team, to collect individual
perceptions of either a team or workgroup, because it is noted that some employees may
work somewhat independently and not have an immediate team. In this case, it was
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asserted that having the option of workgroup, in addition to team, would provide
individuals in this category an opportunity to interpret the concept more broadly, and
respondents, who might otherwise have omitted the questions regarding the team, were
more likely to respond.
The fourth scale used in the first survey wave was an OLC, which is the mediator
variable, and this scale is comprised of 21 items (Yang, 2003). This scale measures items
relating to the firm’s value of learning behaviors, and these include behaviors from the
lower levels of the firm to the management level. The original Dimensions of the
Learning Organization Questionnaire scale includes 43 items enumerated by Marsick and
Watkins (2003), and 21 of the items are identified as a shortened form of the survey. The
items in the scale were not modified, and they were based upon a Likert type scale from 1
– Almost Never to 6 – Almost Always.
The first and second scales used in the second survey wave measured both
individual Psychological Ownership (PO) and CPO, and the PO scale consisted of seven
items, while the CPO scale consisted of four items (Pierce et al., 2018; Van Dyne &
Pierce, 2004). The PO scale primarily evaluates psychological ownership at the
individual level, except for two collectively worded items, but the CPO scale solely
measures psychological ownership at the collective level. Although PO is not in the
conceptual model or hypotheses, it was of interest to determine whether or not there are
differences in feelings of ownership at the individual or collective level, which provides
the opportunity for analyzing an alternative model. None of the items in either scale were
modified from the originally validated version, and the responses on both were based
upon a Likert type scale from 1 – Strongly Disagree to 7 – Strongly Agree.
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The third scale used in the second survey wave measured OCB-O, which is the
second outcome variable, and this scale consists of eight items (Lee & Allen, 2002).
These eight items measure an employee’s willingness to perform extra-role behaviors to
benefit the organization, and these behaviors include a variety of actions from attending
functions that help the firm’s image, as well publicly advocating on behalf of the firm and
defending the firm from negative remarks. The survey items were not modified from the
originally validated measure, and the responses were based upon a Likert type scale from
1 – Strongly Disagree to 7 – Strongly Agree.
Phase seven began with the submission of a third survey wave, to the principal,
top manager, or non-owner financial employee, and in this survey, company demographic
information and historical performance comparison information was collected.
Specifically, return on assets is a measure used to calculate the degree of agency cost, and
Dess and Robinson (1984) developed a scale for business owners to accurately rate firm
performance around sales growth, return on assets, and overall performance in relation to
firm peers, when financial data are not readily available. The measure asked the
principal/top manager to rate the firm performance from 1 – Lowest 20% to 5 – Top 20%
to other firms with similar volume in the same industry and/or region, and instead of
asking about an unspecified period of sales growth, return on assets, and overall
performance, the items have been modified to discuss those metrics in relation to firm
peers within the past five years. These surveys were emailed directly to the firm
principal, top manager, or non-owner financial employee to be completed, but the
researcher reached out directly to make a follow up appeal, when the surveys were not
completed within the first week of being sent. Also included in the third wave survey is a
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15-item scale on general firm performance, and this Delaney and Huselid (1996) scale is
used in addition to the Dess and Robinson (1984) performance measures above.

4.3 Data Coding
The data were collected from the employees of six different firms in two different
waves, and the data from all organizations were consolidated into one file and coded for
analysis. Additionally, the financial performance metrics from the third wave surveys
needed to be added to each of the employee responses, to run the analyses, and this was
done to ensure that employee responses were linked back to the firm performance
feedback provided by the firm owner, top manager, or non-owner financial employee.
The scales above are all reflectively measured constructs for the three proposed
antecedents, the mediator, and the outcome variables, but there are a few scales with
reverse coded items. The results were imported into the IBM SPSS Version 27 software
package in order to reverse code the negatively worded measurement items. In the first
survey wave, there were a total of twelve items among the antecedents and mediator
variable that needed to be recoded, and they included one item in the OID scale and
eleven items from the IC scale (Mael & Tetrick, 1992; Scott & Bruce, 1994). While the
proposed outcome variables of CPO and OCB-O do not have any reverse coded items,
the PO scale had one item, and this item was reverse coded as well.

4.4 Measurement of Variables
Although the small sample size of 39 is a limitation, the SmartPLS software
package is capable of performing robust analyses to determine the internal consistency,
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reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity, R2, f 2, statistical significance, and
hypothesis testing for this sample. Certain guidelines were followed to ensure this robust
analysis. First, internal consistency was determined by the construct Cronbach’s Alpha,
and this measure of internal consistency for each construct in SmartPLS met a minimum
threshold of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2017). Second, the measure to determine construct
reliability is Composite Reliability, which essentially ensures there is a tight shot group
of the items measured. This measure of reliability needed to be greater than 0.70, with
consideration to the indicator loadings discussed later (Hair et al., 2017). Third, the
measure of convergent validity used for this analysis is the average variance extracted
(AVE), which evaluates the correlation of the measured items with alternative items of
the same construct, and for the construct to demonstrate convergent validity, the AVE
must exceed a threshold of 0.50 (Hair et al., 2017). The assessment of the measurement
models followed the confirmatory composite analysis (CCA) procedure (Hair et al.,
2020).
As noted above, the indicators of each construct needed to be assessed in tandem
with the measures of internal consistency, reliability, and convergent validity, and in the
next section, each indicator below a value of 0.708 is quantitatively and qualitatively
assessed for retention in the model (Hair et al., 2017). The quantitative assessment
included evaluating the Cronbach’s Alpha, Composite Reliability, and AVE, ensuring
values exceed 0.70, 0.70, and 0.50 respectively. The qualitative assessment evaluated
whether or not the measured items possess face validity or qualitatively appear to
measure the construct (Hair et al., 2017; Hair et al., 2019).
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Once the measures of internal consistency, reliability, and convergent validity
have been assessed, it becomes important to assess discriminant validity or how
distinctive the measured constructs are in relation to other constructs in the model
(Henseler et al., 2015). The Fornell-Larker Criterion was used to measure the construct
AVE with the squared correlations of the other constructs in the model to determine
empirical distinctiveness, and the cross loadings of the construct will be assessed to
determine if items load highly on multiple constructs (Henseler et al., 2015). These two
approaches are the more traditional means of assessing differences among constructs, but
the heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) is shown to determine empirical distinction more
accurately; though it should be noted that there are three versions of HTMT listed from
most conservative to most liberal: HTMT85, HTMT90, and HTMTinference (Henseler et al.,
2015). Given the smaller sample size of 39, the moderately conservative measure of
discriminant validity of HTMT90 was used for the analysis.
A few metrics were used to measure the amount of variance explained within the
model, including the coefficient of determination or R2, the effect size or f 2, and
PLSpredict (Manley et al., 2021; Shmueli, et al., 2019). The R2 measure is perhaps the
most commonly used item to measure structural models, and it measures the predictive
power of the model in sample (Hair et al., 2017). On the other hand, the effect size or f 2
represents the change in R2, which is the correlation coefficient squared or the coefficient
of determination, and the effect sizes of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 signal a small, medium, or
large effect on the outcome variable (Hair et al., 2019). Finally, as noted earlier, due to
the smaller sample size an exploratory 0.10 level of significance was used to test the
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relationships among the variables within the model, and these hypotheses measured the
direct and indirect effects of these relationships.
The third prediction metric evaluated for the structural model is out-of-sample
prediction based on PLSpredict error results. While PLS-SEM maximizes the explained
variance of endogenous constructs within a structural model, it also provides the tools for
evaluating the out-of-sample predictive power, and this is performed with PLSpredict
(Shmueli et al., 2016; 2019). The results can be assessed by evaluating two prediction
statistics: root mean squared error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE; Shmueli et
al., 2019). The RMSE assesses the squared differences between the measured
observations and predictions, by calculating the square root of the mean of these
differences (Shmueli et al., 2019). The MAE takes the average of errors within the set of
predictions, regardless of directionality, and assuming equal weights, it expresses the
absolute differences between the measured observations and predictions (Shmueli et al.,
2019). These metrics are then compared with the linear regression model (LM)
Benchmark, and if the indicators display lower RMSE and MAE values compared to the
LM Benchmark, then the model has high predictive power (Shmueli et al., 2019).
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

The content of this chapter provides an overview of the results of testing the
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4. First, this chapter describes the model estimation of
the constructs within the proposed measurement model, evaluating the loadings of the
observations on these constructs. Second, this chapter includes the assessment of the
internal consistency, reliability, and convergent validity of the constructs within the
model. Third, this chapter assesses the discriminant validity among the constructs within
the model. Fourth, this chapter discusses the hypothesized structural model. Finally, post
hoc analyses are performed by evaluating moderation in the hypothesized structural
model, assessing an alternative model, and testing the relationships of the outcome
variables with firm performance measures.

5.1 Model Estimation
There are a total of six constructs that are measured within this hypothesized
model: Organizational Identification (OID), Innovation Climate (IC), Team
Empowerment (TE), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC), Collective Psychological
Ownership (CPO), and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O)
(Kirkman et al., 2004; Lee & Allen, 2002; Mael & Tetrick, 1992; Pierce et al., 2018;
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Scott & Bruce, 1994; Yang, 2003). Additionally, employee respondents were asked to
provide information on Psychological Ownership (PO), and the firm principal, top
manager, or non-owner financial employee was asked to provide information on financial
performance, indicating the presence or absence of agency costs (Delaney & Huselid,
1996; Dess & Robinson, 1984; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Once all the employee
responses to the two survey waves were consolidated, they were imported into SmartPLS
to perform model estimation analysis. The intent was to remove all items not approaching
the recommended indicator reliability threshold of 0.708 (Hair et al., 2017). However, it
should be noted that upon quantitative analysis of composite reliability and average
variance extracted (AVE), as well as content validity qualitative analysis, some items
above 0.60 but below 0.708 were retained. Assessment of the measurement models
followed the confirmatory composite analysis (CCA) procedure (Hair et al., 2020).
Table 2 depicts the reliabilities of the observed variables on the latent constructs,
and the loadings in green indicate that items are above the recommended loading
threshold of 0.708. Indicators not meeting recommended guidelines were removed from
the measurement model one at a time, with the model being re-run after each iteration.
The first antecedent construct OID presented only minor issues within the model, as Item
8 exhibits a loading of 0.196. Since the indicator loading is well below the 0.708
recommended threshold, this item was removed. The second antecedent construct IC
required the removal of eleven of the twenty-two items from the construct. The last of the
antecedent variables TE required removal of three of the eleven indicators.
The mediator variable, OLC, was measured with the Yang (2003) scale, and this
scale contains twenty-one items. Item 7 exhibited a loading of 0.497 on the OLC
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construct, and item 8 exhibited a loading of 0.536 on the OLC construct. Both of these
items were below the recommended loading threshold of 0.708, and these two items were
removed sequentially from the model. Once the indicator variables were removed, the
model was subsequently rerun.
The first outcome construct of CPO has four indicator variables, all of which
exhibited loadings above the 0.708 level, and two of the eight indicator variables from the
outcome construct OCB-O were removed. The Delaney and Huselid (1996) measure for
the post-analysis test assessing the presence or absence of agency cost, needed six
indicators removed. The interesting thing to note about this scale is that items 5, 10, and
13 all had negative loadings, but the questions in the scale were not worded negatively or
supposed to be reverse coded. The Dess and Robinson (1984) three item scale would run
in SmartPLS with any of the single items or any two items, but the model would not run
with all three items, even with the removal of the Delaney and Huselid (1996) construct.
The item within the Dess and Robinson (1984) scale of particular interest is the
return on assets (ROA), which has previously been used as an inverse indicator of agency
costs (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). Thus, the analysis includes evaluating firm general
performance with the Delaney and Huselid (1996) measure and the single item ROA
measure within the Dess and Robinson (1984) scale to evaluate agency costs.
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Table 2. Loadings of Indicators on the Constructs within the Conceptual Model. These are the loadings of all the indicators on the
constructs within the conceptual model: Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO), Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Organizational (OCB-O), Organizational Identification (OID), Team Empowerment (TE), the Delaney and Huselid (1996)
measure of Firm Performance, Organizational Learning Culture (OLC), and Innovation Climate (IC).
Collective Psychological Ownership
(Indicator Reliability)
CPO_1
0.977

CPO_2
0.990

CPO_3
0.989

CPO_4
0.824

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (Indicator
Reliability)
OCB_1 OCB_2 OCB_3 OCB_4 OCB_5 OCB_6 OCB_7 OCB_8
0.708
0.775
0.860
0.762
0.475
0.811
0.656
0.878

Organizational Identification (Indicator Reliability)
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OID_1
0.793

OID_2
0.718

OID_3
0.799

OID_4
0.781

TE_1
0.781

TE_2
0.206

TE_3
0.602

TE_4
0.879

OID_5
0.777

OID_6
0.744

OID_7
0.670

OID_8
0.196

OID_9
0.652

OID_10
0.601

Team Empowerment (Indicator Reliability)
TE_5
0.859

TE_6
0.858

TE_7
0.689

TE_8
0.678

TE_9
0.707

TE_10
0.444

TE_11
0.473

TE_12
0.659

Delaney and Huselid - Firm Performance (Indicator Reliability)
DH_1
0.703

DH_2
0.712

DH_3
0.638

DH_4
0.618

DH_5
DH_6
-0.317
0.417

DH_7
0.334

DH_8
0.317

DH_9
0.285

DH_10 DH_11
-0.179
0.327

DH_12
0.699

DH_13 DH_14
-0.205
0.659

DH_15
0.870

Organizational Learning Culture (Indicator Reliability)
OLC_1 OLC_2 OLC_3 OLC_4 OLC_5 OLC_6 OLC_7 OLC_8 OLC_9 OLC_10 OLC_11 OLC_12 OLC_13 OLC_14 OLC_15 OLC_16 OLC_17 OLC_18 OLC_19 OLC_20 OLC_21
0.728
0.729
0.754
0.741
0.656
0.726
0.497
0.536
0.772
0.746
0.707
0.736
0.845
0.750
0.797
0.747
0.663
0.716
0.851
0.842
0.674

Innovation Climate (Indicator Reliability)
IC_1
IC_2
IC_3
IC_4
IC_5
IC_6
IC_7
IC_8
IC_9
IC_10 IC_11 IC_12 IC_13 IC_14 IC_15 IC_16 IC_17 IC_18 IC_19 IC_20 IC_21 IC_22
0.809
0.835
0.742
0.031
0.523
0.808
0.344
0.356
0.009
0.826
0.183
0.124
0.587
0.849
0.826
0.736
0.443
0.451
0.670
0.766
0.717
0.413

5.2 Consistency, Reliability, and Validity
Instead of arbitrarily removing indicator variables with loadings falling below the
recommended threshold of 0.708, there was a particular focus on increasing the
composite reliability as well as the AVE of the constructs (Hair et al., 2017, p. 122; Hair
et al., 2020). Additionally, qualitative analysis was performed to ensure the items
remaining continued to demonstrate content or face validity. Following the removal of
these indicators, Table 3 shows the measures for internal consistency, reliability, and
convergent validity.

Table 3. Construct Consistency, Reliability, and Validity Measures. Displays the
construct consistency measure of Cronbach’s Alpha, reliability measure of Composite
Reliability, and the validity measure of Average Variance Extracted (AVE).
Consistency, Reliability, and Validity
Cronbach's Alpha rho_A Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted (AVE)
OID
0.892
0.892
0.913
0.540
IC
0.942
0.948
0.950
0.633
TE
0.908
0.927
0.924
0.577
OLC
0.956
0.960
0.960
0.562
CPO
0.964
0.952
0.966
0.877
OCB-O
0.908
0.981
0.927
0.681
PERF
0.907
0.936
0.915
0.552

All of the above constructs exhibit internal consistency, with Cronbach’s Alpha
values above the minimum threshold of 0.70, and OID exhibited the lowest value of
0.892. Additionally, the constructs have acceptable reliability, with composite reliability
values above the minimum threshold of 0.70, and OID has the lowest value of 0.913.
Moreover, convergent validity is measured by assessing AVE values above the 0.50
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minimum threshold, and all the above constructs exceed that minimum threshold, with
OID at 0.540 having the lowest value. Discriminant validity is the final test of validity to
be reported, and this measure analyzes the empirical distinctiveness of the constructs.

5.3 Discriminant Validity
Discriminant validity analysis evaluates how different the constructs are from
each other quantitatively, and there are a few techniques used below to determine this
difference. First, the most traditional method is the Fornell-Larcker Criterion, which
compared the square root of the AVE with the squared correlations of all of the other
constructs in the model. Second, the evaluations of cross loadings, which assessed each
indicator within all constructs to ensure that indicators do not load strongly on multiple
constructs (Henseler et al., 2015). Finally, the heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) was
performed, and due to the smaller sample size, the less conservative threshold of HTMT90
was used.

Table 4. Fornell-Larcker Criterion for Establishing Discriminant Validity. The FornellLarcker Criterion establishes discriminant validity among the variables in the model:
Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO), Innovation Climate (IC), Organizational
Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), Organizational Identification (OID),
Organizational Learning Culture (OLC), Performance (PERF), and Team Empowerment
(TE).

CPO
IC
OCBO
OID
OLC
PERF
TE

Fornell-Larcker Criterion (Discriminant Validity)
CPO
IC
OCBO
OID
OLC
PERF
0.936
0.175
0.795
0.227
0.374
0.825
-0.093
0.375
0.568
0.735
0.066
0.400
0.578
0.843
0.749
0.180
0.119
0.257
0.277
0.136
0.743
0.618
0.366
0.317
0.031
0.358
0.095
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TE

0.759

Table 4 displays the first evaluation of discriminant validity. The Fornell-Larcker
criterion evaluation of empirical distinctiveness demonstrates that all but one of the
constructs are distinctively different from one another, but the square root of the AVE of
OLC exhibits a lower value of 0.749 than the squared correlation value of 0.843 with the
construct of IC. This indicates there may be some overlap between the constructs of OLC
and IC, but additional analysis with cross-loadings and the HTMT ratio are required.

Table 5. Cross Loadings of Organizational Identification Construct. Displays the cross
loadings of Organizational Identification (OID) on the other constructs: Collective
Psychological Ownership (CPO), Innovation Climate (IC), Organizational Citizenship
Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC),
Performance (PERF), and Team Empowerment (TE).

OID_1
OID_2
OID_3
OID_4
OID_5
OID_6
OID_7
OID_9
OID_10

Organizational Identification (Cross Loadings)
CPO
IC OCBO
OID
OLC
PERF
0.124
0.292
0.520
0.435
0.185
0.802
-0.074
0.129
0.537
0.307
0.137
0.733
-0.188
0.202
0.396
0.422
0.134
0.804
0.002
0.126
0.321
0.377
0.198
0.793
-0.216
0.308
0.439
0.461
0.265
0.780
-0.172
0.280
0.485
0.415
0.264
0.750
0.223
0.311
0.679
0.349
0.329
0.692
-0.195
0.382
0.252
0.459
0.217
0.625
-0.044
0.352
0.210
0.497
0.103
0.602
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TE
0.023
-0.085
-0.143
-0.015
-0.009
-0.067
0.236
0.060
0.177

Table 6. Cross Loadings of Innovation Climate Construct. Displays cross loadings of
Innovation Climate (IC) on the other constructs: Collective Psychological Ownership
(CPO), Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), Organizational
Identification (OID), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC), Performance (PERF), and
Team Empowerment (TE).

IC_1
IC_2
IC_3
IC_6
IC_10
IC_14
IC_15
IC_16
IC_19
IC_20
IC_21

Innovation Climate (Cross Loadings)
CPO
IC
OCBO
OID
OLC
0.239
0.495
0.520
0.813
0.839
0.325
0.572
0.502
0.787
0.858
0.205
0.228
0.103
0.603
0.752
0.148
0.298
0.288
0.652
0.825
0.004
0.308
0.297
0.721
0.818
0.094
0.238
0.227
0.684
0.833
0.000
0.221
0.399
0.657
0.846
0.002
0.133
0.133
0.569
0.774
0.196
0.119
0.029
0.447
0.700
0.152
0.278
0.346
0.702
0.769
0.134
0.215
0.235
0.625
0.716

PERF
0.198
0.185
-0.009
0.302
0.268
0.070
0.263
-0.084
-0.202
-0.017
-0.117

TE
0.332
0.419
0.511
0.256
0.147
0.281
0.117
0.119
0.289
0.337
0.384

Table 5 displays the indicators of OID. All items all load strongly on the OID
construct, but it should be pointed out that OID 7 does load nearly as strongly on the
OCB-O construct. Table 6 evaluates the indicators of IC with all the other constructs, and
while these items loadings are all higher on the IC construct, a number of items reveal
strong loadings on the OLC construct. As with the Fornell-Larcker criterion test above,
these two constructs appear to have some difficulty demonstrating empirical distinction,
but further analysis is required.
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Table 7. Cross Loadings of Team Empowerment Construct. Displays the cross loadings
of Team Empowerment (TE) on the other constructs: Collective Psychological Ownership
(CPO), Innovation Climate (IC), Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational
(OCB-O), Organizational Identification (OID), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC),
and Performance (PERF).

TE_1
TE_3
TE_4
TE_5
TE_6
TE_7
TE_8
TE_9
TE_12

Team Empowerment (Cross Loadings)
CPO
IC
OCBO
OID
OLC
0.416
0.325
0.122
-0.007
0.335
0.233
0.147
0.161
-0.025
0.057
0.534
0.253
0.400
0.050
0.313
0.521
0.256
0.402
0.101
0.288
0.601
0.281
0.293
0.050
0.288
0.512
0.356
0.067
0.031
0.349
0.520
0.309
0.283
-0.098
0.201
0.357
0.270
0.191
0.048
0.209
0.314
0.171
0.288
-0.034
0.130
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PERF
-0.002
-0.053
0.244
0.216
0.097
-0.156
0.091
0.069
0.139

TE
0.794
0.649
0.889
0.867
0.870
0.674
0.672
0.690
0.677

Table 8. Cross Loadings of Organizational Learning Culture Construct. Displays the
cross loadings of Organizational Learning Culture (OLC) on other constructs: Collective
Psychological Ownership (CPO), Innovation Climate (IC), Organizational Citizenship
Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), Organizational Identification (OID), Performance
(PERF), and Team Empowerment (TE).

OLC_1
OLC_2
OLC_3
OLC_4
OLC_5
OLC_6
OLC_9
OLC_10
OLC_11
OLC_12
OLC_13
OLC_14
OLC_15
OLC_16
OLC_17
OLC_18
OLC_19
OLC_20
OLC_21

Organizational Learning Culture (Cross Loadings)
CPO
IC
OCBO
OID
OLC
PERF
0.038
0.496
0.363
0.548
0.061
0.728
0.058
0.502
0.237
0.349
0.110
0.724
-0.090
0.475
0.211
0.319
-0.015
0.745
-0.071
0.662
0.118
0.413
-0.096
0.733
0.009
0.556
0.186
0.327
-0.041
0.642
-0.038
0.559
0.211
0.424
0.089
0.718
0.061
0.589
0.241
0.559
0.110
0.761
0.074
0.660
0.519
0.606
0.248
0.756
0.069
0.544
0.233
0.400
0.138
0.707
-0.041
0.574
0.215
0.341
0.038
0.751
-0.091
0.688
0.224
0.427
0.222
0.846
-0.031
0.275
0.494
0.284
0.777
0.739
0.129
0.704
0.395
0.544
0.151
0.801
0.089
0.754
0.460
0.440
0.044
0.758
0.104
0.619
0.334
0.362
0.087
0.683
0.088
0.575
0.263
0.316
-0.012
0.721
0.016
0.726
0.364
0.451
-0.058
0.861
0.194
0.736
0.386
0.513
0.131
0.855
0.281
0.639
0.234
0.228
0.333
0.664

TE
0.348
0.206
0.235
0.214
0.140
0.342
0.239
0.303
0.254
0.233
0.203
0.114
0.376
0.266
0.123
0.373
0.333
0.345
0.394

Table 7 displays the indicators of TE with all of the other constructs, and all the
indicator variables have higher loadings on the TE construct than any others within the
model. Table 8 displays the OLC indicators, and as with the IC indicators, many of the
indicators exhibit high loadings on the IC construct, with the OLC 14 indicator having a
higher loading on the IC construct. However, the OLC 14 item was retained in the model
after qualitatively assessing content or face validity.
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Table 9. Cross Loadings of Collective Psychological Ownership Construct. Displays the
cross loadings of Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO) on the other constructs:
Innovation Climate (IC), Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O),
Organizational Identification (OID), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC),
Performance (PERF), and Team Empowerment (TE).

CPO_1
CPO_2
CPO_3
CPO_4

Collective Psychological Owernship (Cross Loadings)
CPO
IC OCBO
OID
OLC
PERF
0.201
0.233
-0.095
0.092
0.222
0.986
0.169
0.208
-0.098
0.052
0.137
0.990
0.136
0.201
-0.088
0.042
0.135
0.985
0.082
-0.035
-0.120
0.017
-0.075
0.765

TE
0.620
0.606
0.601
0.470

Table 10. Cross Loadings of Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational
Construct. Displays the cross loadings of Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Organizational (OCB-O) on the other constructs: Collective Psychological Ownership
(CPO), Innovation Climate (IC), Organizational Identification (OID), Organizational
Learning Culture (OLC), Performance (PERF), and Team Empowerment (TE).
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
CPO
IC
OCBO
0.160
0.170
OCB_1
0.731
0.174
0.167
OCB_2
0.693
0.243
0.302
OCB_3
0.930
0.011
0.271
OCB_4
0.775
0.161
0.454
OCB_6
0.860
0.266
0.348
OCB_8
0.932
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Organizational (Cross Loadings)
OID
OLC
PERF
TE
0.300
0.259
0.040
0.333
0.265
0.165
0.015
0.284
0.561
0.292
0.273
0.297
0.566
0.270
-0.006
0.139
0.626
0.499
0.259
0.144
0.435
0.354
0.366
0.374

Table 11. Cross Loadings of the Delaney and Huselid Firm Performance Construct.
Displays the cross loadings of the Delaney and Huselid measure of Firm Performance on
the other constructs: Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO), Innovation Climate
(IC), Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), Organizational
Identification (OID), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC), and Team Empowerment
(TE).

DH_1
DH_2
DH_4
DH_6
DH_7
DH_9
DH_12
DH_14
DH_15

Delaney and Huselid
CPO
IC
0.339
-0.093
0.082
0.030
0.261
0.166
-0.060
0.267
-0.042
0.213
0.225
-0.119
0.391
0.121
0.054
-0.047
-0.068
0.250

- Firm Performance
OCBO
OID
0.215
0.164
0.195
0.195
0.155
0.251
0.090
0.156
0.059
0.091
0.037
-0.098
0.202
0.194
0.196
0.114
0.291
0.405

(Cross Loadings)
OLC
PERF
-0.077
0.791
0.069
0.915
0.246
0.686
0.291
0.583
0.239
0.556
-0.087
0.683
0.123
0.762
-0.065
0.877
0.228
0.752

TE
0.070
0.091
0.187
0.181
0.225
0.341
0.211
0.048
-0.175

Table 9 displays the indicator loadings of CPO on all constructs in the model, and
these indicators demonstrate discriminant validity with the other constructs, as these
items loadings are stronger on the CPO construct than any others. Table 10 showcases
OCB-O, and all the indicator loadings are stronger on the OCB-O construct than the
others within the model, indicating discriminant validity. Finally, Table 11 looks at the
Delaney and Huselid (1996) construct of general firm performance and measures the
loadings of these indicators on the other constructs within the model, and the cross
loadings test demonstrates discriminant validity with the other constructs in the model.
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Table 12. Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio Test for Discriminant Validity. Displays the
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) Test for Discriminant Validity among all of the
constructs: Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO), Innovation Climate (IC),
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O), Organizational
Identification (OID), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC), Performance (PERF1),
Team Empowerment (TE) and Return on Assets (ROA).

IC
OCBO
OID
OLC
PERF1
ROA
TE

Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (Discriminant Validity)
CPO
IC
OCBO
OID
OLC
PERF1
0.182
0.200
0.356
0.201
0.405
0.631
0.119
0.865
0.385
0.600
0.226
0.277
0.235
0.303
0.282
0.183
0.289
0.180
0.157
0.282
0.712
0.613
0.384
0.359
0.182
0.359
0.290

ROA

0.257

Table 12 displays the most robust discriminant validity test performed, and this
assesses the HTMT ratio. As noted earlier, given the smaller sample size and conceptual
similarity of the two constructs of IC and OLC, this analysis was performed at the
HTMT90 level, which is a more flexible threshold than the most conservative HTMT85
(Henseler et al., 2015). Consistently with the other tests, all constructs demonstrate
conceptual distinctiveness with the other constructs in the measurement model, with the
exception of IC and OLC. However, at the 0.865 level, this is below the 0.90 threshold,
and this demonstrates an acceptable level of discriminant validity to move forward with
testing the relationships within the structural model.

5.4 Structural Model
The structural model in Figure 2 reflects the conceptual model proposed in
Chapter 3. Assessment of the structural model also follows the CCA procedure (Hair et
al., 2020). The antecedents of OID, IC, and TE precede the mediator of an OLC, with the
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outcome variables being CPO and OCB-O. At first glance the structural model has a few
issues. First, there are likely a few relationships with statistically insignificant results,
given the small path coefficients. The path coefficient of 0.09, rounded to 0.10, reflecting
the relationship between TE and an OLC, as well as the path coefficient of 0.07 reflecting
the relationship between an OLC and CPO are both likely non-significant. Moreover, the
coefficient of determination or R2 for the outcome variable of CPO is 0.00, which
indicates that construct of CPO does not explain any of the variance within the model
(Hair et al., 2017).
At the same time, there also appear to be some promising signs from the results of
the structural model, with the mediator variable of an OLC and the outcome variable of
OCB-O. The R2 of 0.80 for the mediator variable of OLC, points to the fact that the
mediator variable explains eighty percent of the variance within the first half of the
model. Additionally, the R2 of 0.19 for the outcome variable of OCB-O indicates that this
construct explains nineteen percent of the variance within the model. Although not listed
in the charts below, there is a medium effect size or f 2 of 0.184, which is only slightly
lower than the R2 (Hair et al., 2019).
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Figure 2. Structural Model of Relationship Outcome Coefficient of Hypotheses and Variables. Displays the structural model of the
relationship outcome coefficient of hypotheses and variables. This model evaluates the relationship of the antecedents of Innovation Climate
(IC), Organizational Identification (OID), Team Empowerment (TE), with the mediator variable of Organizational Learning Culture (OLC),
and with the outcome variables of Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO) and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational
(OCB-O).

Finally, the model was evaluated for out-of-sample predictive power, by using the
PLSpredict calculation tool in SmartPLS. The calculation was performed using the
recommended settings of ten folds over ten reptations, with a path weighting scheme, a
maximum of three hundred iterations, stop criterion of seven, and mean replacement of
missing values (Shmueli et al., 2019). Table 13 compares the performance of the
hypothesized model to a regression model alternative for the root mean squared error
(RMSE) and the mean absolute error (MAE). This compares the actual observations
within the sample against a linear regression model baseline (LM Baseline), which is
indicative of out of sample observations (Hair et al., 2019). The RMSE and the MAE are
lower than the linear regression benchmark (LM Benchmark) for all indicators, and this
demonstrates this model has high predictive power out-of-sample (Shmueli et al., 2019).

Table 13. Out-Of-Sample Predictive Power of the Hypothesized Model. This is the test for
out-of-sample predictive power of the hypothesized model, which evaluates the outcome
variables of Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO) and Organizational Citizenship
Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O) with the root mean squared error (RMSE), the mean
absolute error (MAE), and the linear regression model baseline (LM Baseline).

CPO_4
CPO_2
CPO_3
CPO_1
OCB_2
OCB_8
OCB_3
OCB_6
OCB_1
OCB_4

RMSE LM Benchmark Difference MAE LM Benchmark Difference
1.520
2.909
-1.389 1.147
2.079
-0.932
1.601
2.634
-1.033 1.112
1.936
-0.824
1.623
3.090
-1.467 1.165
2.288
-1.123
1.500
2.230
-0.730 1.082
1.572
-0.490
1.168
3.916
-2.748 0.991
2.917
-1.926
1.208
2.459
-1.251 0.872
1.785
-0.913
1.299
2.832
-1.533 0.977
2.060
-1.083
1.142
1.701
-0.559 0.821
1.317
-0.496
1.474
5.037
-3.563 1.227
3.617
-2.390
0.945
2.804
-1.859 0.760
2.033
-1.273
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5.5 Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesized model was initially tested with the bootstrapping technique,
creating 500 subsamples within the original sample, and the model is analyzed at the 0.10
level of significance. Table 14 displays the tests for the direct and indirect path
coefficients of the hypothesized relationships, and these direct and indirect relationships
are evaluated for statistical significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 14. Hypotheses Tested for each Relationship in the Structural Model. Displays the
hypotheses tested for each relationship in the structural model: Organizational
Identification (OID), Innovation Climate (IC), Team Empowerment (TE), Organizational
Learning Culture (OLC), Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO), and
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O).

Hypotheses
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
H11
H12
H13

Hypothesis Tests
Relationship
Original Sample (O) Sample Mean (M) Standard Deviation (STDEV) T Statistics (|O/STDEV|) P Values
OID --> OLC
0.317
0.322
0.105
3.026 0.003
IC --> OLC
0.689
0.676
0.094
7.319 0.000
TE --> OLC
0.096
0.098
0.092
1.040 0.299
OLC --> CPO
0.066
0.070
0.192
0.343 0.732
OLC (MED) OID--> CPO
0.021
0.018
0.063
0.329 0.742
OLC (MED) IC--> CPO
0.045
0.049
0.131
0.345 0.730
OLC (MED) TE--> CPO
0.006
0.010
0.026
0.241 0.810
OLC --> OCB-O
0.398
0.395
0.177
2.253 0.025
OLC (MED) OID--> OCB-O
0.126
0.130
0.075
1.674 0.095
OLC (MED) IC--> OCB-O
0.274
0.266
0.123
2.224 0.027
OLC (MED) TE--> OCB-O
0.038
0.038
0.044
0.873 0.383
CPO -->OCB-O
0.188
0.189
0.229
0.821 0.412
CPO (MED) OLC-->OCB-O
0.012
0.033
0.057
0.216 0.829

H1 states that OID is positively related to an OLC, and with a path coefficient of
0.317 and a significance level of 0.003, this hypothesis is supported. H2 states that an IC
is positively related to an OLC, and with a path coefficient of 0.689 and a significance
level of 0.000, this hypothesis is supported. H3 states that TE is positively related to an
OLC, but with a path coefficient of 0.096 and a significance level of 0.299, this
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hypothesis is not supported. H4 states that an OLC is positively related to CPO, but with
a path coefficient of 0.066 and a significance level of 0.732, this hypothesis is not
supported. H5 states that an OLC mediates the positive relationship between OID and
CPO, but with an indirect path coefficient of 0.021 and a significance level of 0.742, this
hypothesis is not supported. H6 states that an OLC mediates the positive relationship
between IC and CPO, but with an indirect path coefficient of 0.045 and a significance
level of 0.730, this hypothesis is not supported.
H7 states that an OLC mediates the positive relationship between TE and CPO,
but with an indirect path coefficient of 0.006 and a significance level of 0.810, this
hypothesis is not supported. H8 states that an OLC is positively related to OCB-O, and
with a meaningful path coefficient of 0.398 and a significance level of 0.025, this
hypothesis is supported. H9 states that an OLC mediates the positive relationship
between OID and OCB-O, and with an indirect path coefficient of 0.126 and a
significance level of 0.095, this hypothesis is supported. H10 states that an OLC mediates
the positive relationship between IC and OCB-O, and with an indirect path coefficient of
0.274 and a significance level of 0.027, this hypothesis is supported.
H11 states that an OLC mediates the positive relationship between TE and OCBO, but with an indirect path coefficient of 0.038 and a statistical significance of 0.383,
this hypothesis is not supported. H12 states that CPO is positively related to OCB-O, but
with a path coefficient of 0.188 and a significance level of 0.412, this hypothesis is not
supported. Finally, H13 states that CPO mediates the positive relationship between an
OLC and OCB-O, but with an indirect path coefficient of 0.012 and a statistical
significance of 0.829, this hypothesis is not supported.
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Table 15. Direct Relationship Tests Between Antecedent and Outcome Variables.
Displays the direct relationship tests between antecedent and outcome variables:
Organizational Identification (OID), Innovation Climate (IC), Team Empowerment (TE),
Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO), and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Organizational (OCB-O).

OID->CPO
IC->CPO
TE->CPO
OID->OCBO
IC->OCBO
TE->OCBO

Original Sample (O) Sample Mean (M) Standard Deviation (STDEV) T Statistics (|O/STDEV|) P Values
0.019
0.034
0.200
0.095
0.924
0.258
0.250
0.228
1.132
0.258
0.638
0.637
0.121
5.288
0.000
0.704
0.677
0.220
3.194
0.001
0.341
0.289
0.256
1.330
0.184
0.325
0.360
0.209
1.552
0.121

In addition to testing the hypotheses, it is also important to evaluate the potential
for partial mediation by testing the direct relationships between the antecedents and
outcome variables, and this is especially critical to evaluate the relationships between
both OID and OCB-O and IC and OCB-O, which were statistically significant at the 0.05
and 0.10 levels respectively. Additionally, while TE did not demonstrate meaningful
relationships with any of the constructs in the hypothesized relationships, there is a
meaningful relationship with CPO given the path coefficient of 0.64, and this relationship
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. OID also exhibited a direct relationship with
OCB-O, in addition to the hypothesized mediated relationship above, and the path
coefficient of 0.704 and statistical significance at the 0.01 level indicates that an OLC
only partially mediates this relationship. On the other hand, IC did not exhibit a direct
relationship with OCB-O, given the path coefficient of 0.34 and the statistical
significance well above the 0.10 level at 0.18, and this relationship is fully mediated
through an OLC. None of the other direct relationships tested exhibited statistical
significance at the 0.10 level, and the only non-hypothesized relationship approaching
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that threshold is TE and OCB-O, with a path coefficient of 0.33 and statistical
significance of 0.12. While many of the tests of the hypothesized relationships were not
as anticipated, there are several interesting findings to discuss in the post hoc analyses.

5.6 Post Hoc Analyses
Although the analysis of the structural model provides insight into the relationship
among the variables, there are a few post hoc analyses performed to evaluate potential
moderation. Additionally, some researchers note the difficulty in measuring CPO within
western culture samples of respondents (Su & Ng, 2019), and the PO scale developed in
part by Jon Pierce was used in the second employee survey wave in addition to the CPO
scale developed in part by Jon Pierce, which as noted earlier was also used in the second
employee survey wave (Pierce et al., 2018; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Collecting
information on both constructs permitted the analysis of psychological ownership at both
the individual and collective levels, in the event that this sample did not produce
meaningful results at the collective level. The first series of post hoc analyses will
involve testing for moderation, and the most influential variable evaluated for moderation
involves the employee’s supervisory status.
This study sought to understand the principal and agent relationship between the
owner and top manager, as well as every supervisory-employee relationship throughout
the organization. While the supervisory status of employees did not have a meaningful
influence on any other relationship within the model, Figure 3 and Figure 4 demonstrate
the positive effect an employee’s supervisory status has on the relationship between an
OLC and OCB-O. Recall in Figure 2 that the R2 of the hypothesized structural model was
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0.19, but when the supervisory status of the employee is evaluated as a moderator, the R2
improves to .30, as displayed in Figure 3. Supervisory status as a moderator helps explain
more variance within the hypothesized structural model, but only when moderating the
relationship between an OLC and OCB-O.
Figure 4 provides a graphic depiction of the influence supervisory status has on
the interaction between OCB-O and OLC. OCB-O is the dependent variable along the y
axis of the graph, and OLC is the independent variable along the x axis of the graph. As
indicated in Figure 3, supervisory status positively influences this relationship, and this
interaction occurs in the top right quadrant of the graph. This suggests that an OLC is
more likely to lead to the behaviors of ownership or OCB-O when the employee is in a
supervisory position.
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Figure 3. Effect of Supervisory Status of Employee When Evaluated as Moderator.

Figure 4. Influence of Supervisory Status on Interaction Between Organizational
Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O) and Organizational Learning Culture
(OLC).

Although not enumerated in the hypotheses, a key issue this research attempts to
examine is the problem of agency; namely, does CPO and OCB-O have an inverse
relationship with agency costs? Stated differently, is there a positive relationship of CPO
and OCB-O with general organizational performance and ROA? The OCB-O measure
was tested for direct relationships with the proposed inverse indicators of agency costs,
the Delaney and Huselid (1996) general firm performance scale and the Dess and
Robinson (1984) ROA measure. In Table 16, OCB-O is not related in a statistically
significant way to either the general firm performance measure or ROA. Additionally,
CPO does not have a statistically significant indirect relationship with either measure.
Moreover, it is important to note that none of these relationships approach statistical
significance at the 0.10 level.

85

Table 16. Relationship Test of CPO and OCB-O with Firm Performance. Displays the
relationship test of Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO) and Organizational
Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O) with Firm Performance (PERF) and
Return on Assets (ROA).
Performance Test
Original Sample (O) Sample Mean (M) Standard Deviation (STDEV) T Statistics (|O/STDEV|) P Values
CPO -> OCB-O
0.202
0.177
0.233
0.867
0.386
CPO -> PERF
0.052
0.075
0.126
0.413
0.680
CPO -> ROA
0.015
0.059
0.100
0.151
0.880
OCB-O -> PERF
0.257
0.173
0.407
0.632
0.528
OCB-O -> ROA
0.075
0.036
0.322
0.232
0.816

The proposed antecedent of TE did not approach a meaningful path coefficient or
statistically significant result with any of the hypothesized relationships in the model, and
this was also the case with CPO. Although it should be noted that the non-hypothesized
direct relationship between TE and CPO exhibited statistically significant and meaningful
results at the 0.01 level, but neither of these constructs demonstrated a statistically
significant and meaningful relationship with any other constructs within the model, either
directly or indirectly. In addition to CPO, participants were also asked to provide
responses on PO at the individual level, and the PO items were requested in the event that
relationships at the collective level did not produce meaningful results. The analysis
below tested this by removing the CPO construct and replacing it with the PO construct,
and this analysis yielded different results.
In the structural model in Figure 5, the output exhibits superior results after
replacing CPO with PO. While the PO R2 is only slightly higher than it was with CPO at
0.08, the path coefficients with OLC and OCB-O are statistically significant at the 0.10
level and more meaningful at 0.28 and 0.56, respectively. Additionally, the OCB-O R2 of
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0.44 indicates more variance is explained with this alternative theoretical model than in
the hypothesized structural model, and although not displayed, the f 2 indicates a large
effect size of 0.52 (Hair et al., 2019). Table 17 displays the out-of-sample predictive
power comparing both the PO and OCB-O constructs to the LM Benchmarks. As with
the hypothesized structural model, the RMSE and the MAE are lower than the linear
regression benchmark (LM Benchmark) for all indicators of both constructs, and this
signifies the alternative model has high predictive power out-of-sample (Shmueli et al.,
2019).
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Figure 5. Relationship Change After CPO is Replaced with Psychological Ownership (PO). Displays the relationship change after
Collective Psychological Ownership (CPO) is replaced with Psychological Ownership (PO) in the alternative model.

Table 17. Out-Of-Sample Predictive Power of the Alternative Model. This is the test for
out-of-sample predictive power of the alternative model, which evaluates the outcome
variables of Psychological Ownership (PO) and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Organizational (OCB-O) with the root mean squared error (RMSE), the mean absolute
error (MAE), and the linear regression model baseline (LM Baseline).
OCB_8
OCB_3
OCB_2
OCB_6
OCB_4
OCB_1
PO_5
PO_7
PO_4
PO_2
PO_3
PO_1

RMSE LM Benchmark Difference MAE LM Benchmark Difference
1.227
2.551
-1.324
0.879
1.915
-1.036
1.333
3.48
-2.147
0.999
2.442
-1.443
1.172
5.053
-3.881
0.992
3.649
-2.657
1.188
2.149
-0.961
0.85
1.597
-0.747
0.952
2.386
-1.434
0.763
1.838
-1.075
1.456
3.623
-2.167
1.21
2.872
-1.662
1.717
5.053
-3.336
1.403
3.713
-2.31
1.668
5.115
-3.447
1.367
3.917
-2.55
1.972
7.152
-5.18
1.603
5.165
-3.562
1.579
4.991
-3.412
1.3
3.667
-2.367
1.735
4.939
-3.204
1.408
3.676
-2.268
1.802
6.104
-4.302
1.372
4.574
-3.202

Table 18. Hypotheses Tested for Relationships in the Alternative Structural Model.
Displays the hypotheses tested for relationships in the alternative model among the
variables: Organizational Identification (OID), Innovation Climate (IC), Team
Empowerment (TE), Organizational Learning Culture (OLC), Collective Psychological
Ownership (CPO), and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O).
Hypotheses
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
H11
H12
H13

Alternative Model Hypothesis Tests (Replacing CPO with PO)
Relationship
Original Sample (O) Sample Mean (M) Standard Deviation (STDEV) T Statistics (|O/STDEV|) P Values
OID --> OLC
0.319
0.311
0.112
2.835
0.005
IC --> OLC
0.690
0.689
0.102
6.778
0.000
TE --> OLC
0.097
0.094
0.089
1.092
0.275
OLC --> PO
0.277
0.306
0.141
1.959
0.051
OLC (MED) OID--> PO
0.088
0.098
0.062
1.432
0.153
OLC (MED) IC--> PO
0.191
0.208
0.098
1.954
0.051
OLC (MED) TE--> PO
0.027
0.031
0.032
0.833
0.405
OLC --> OCBO
0.382
0.382
0.167
2.288
0.023
OLC (MED) OID--> OCB-O
0.122
0.121
0.072
1.697
0.090
OLC (MED) IC--> OCB-O
0.264
0.262
0.121
2.180
0.030
OLC (MED) TE--> OCB-O
0.037
0.036
0.039
0.951
0.342
PO -->OCB-O
0.561
0.579
0.111
5.067
0.000
PO (MED) OLC-->OCB-O
0.155
0.174
0.087
1.786
0.075

Table 18 displays the results for the original hypotheses with the alternative
theoretical model, replacing the construct of CPO with the construct of PO, and the
results are markedly different. While the relationship between the construct of TE and all
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other variables in the model remain statistically insignificant, nearly all other
relationships display statistically significant results at the 0.10 level of significance, but
this also does exclude the indirect relationship between OID and PO, which is not
statistically significant at the 0.10 level. It is now time to transition to discussion of the
implications of these results.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The content of this chapter includes the discussion of the results of the study and
conclusions drawn. The first section addresses a recap of the study and hypothesized
relationships, as well as provides general inferences about the meaning of these
relationships. The second section addresses the limitations of the study. The third section
discusses the theoretical implications. The fourth section addresses the practical
implications for managers. The fifth section outlines avenues of potential future research,
and the final section provides a general conclusion for the study.

6.1 Discussion
This study set out to examine the questions of whether the cost associated with the
entire set of principal-agent relationships within a firm matters to organizational
performance, and to examine how a firm minimizes the costs associated with agency in
the absence of legal ownership interests. The intent was to determine if there is a way to
create favorable conditions for non-owner employees to feel a sense of Collective
Psychological Ownership (CPO) for the firm and exhibit the Organizational Citizenship
Behaviors Organizational (OCB-O) towards the firm that one would expect from an
owner, rather than non-owner employees. At the individual level, these feelings and
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behaviors are the result of Psychological Ownership (PO), and when employees feel a
sense of ownership, they may be more likely to exhibit a greater sense of efficacy,
identity, and having a place (Pierce et al., 2003). In the same way individuals experience
feelings of ownership, groups can also experience a sense of collective ownership, and
“collective psychological ownership is the collectively held sense (feeling) that this target
of ownership (or a piece of that target) is collectively ‘ours’ ” (Pierce & Jussila, 2010, p.
812). However, these feelings and behaviors do not develop in a vacuum.

Figure 6. Structural Model of Organizational Learning Culture with Resultant Paths.

Pierce and Jussila (2010) argue that group learning will precede these collective
feelings of ownership, and building a culture around learning, was proposed here to make
that relationship more durable. However, this does not appear to be the case with the
present study, because Figure 6 above demonstrates that the path coefficient between
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Organizational Learning Culture (OLC) and CPO is not meaningful nor statistically
significant at the 0.10 level. While it is noted that an OLC maintains a component of
culture, these results mirror the Pierce et al. (2018) study, where the relationship between
group learning and CPO did not exhibit a statistically significant relationship below the
0.05 level.
On the other hand, developing an OLC within the firm does appear to set the
favorable conditions for some behaviors of ownership to emerge. Figure 6 displays that
the direct relationship between an OLC and OCB-O exhibits a meaningful path
coefficient of 0.398, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, the
direct path coefficient of 0.188 between CPO and OCB-O is not statistically significant at
the 0.10 level. The focus thus far has only evaluated the direct relationships between the
mediator and outcome variables.
The three constructs proposed to set the favorable conditions for an OLC to
emerge are as follows: Organizational Identification (OID), Innovation Climate (IC), and
Team Empowerment (TE). The antecedents listed above and the OLC mediator variable
were measured in the first survey wave. As individuals identify with organizations,
Chughtai and Buckley (2010) maintain that these individuals are more likely to engage in
the vital organizational learning behaviors of monitoring and feedback seeking.
Consistent with the assertion, OID maintains a meaningful path coefficient of 0.317 with
an OLC, as this path is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Additionally, Huber
(1991) argues that adaptation and innovation are both crucial for organizations in a
quickly evolving environment, and by encouraging flexibility, adaptability, idea
generation, and openness to change, an IC set the favorable conditions for an OLC to
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emerge (Scott & Bruce, 1994). Also consistent with the assertion, the construct of IC
exhibits a meaningful path coefficient of 0.689 with and OLC, which is statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. Some have argued that “Empowerment is one of the
important characteristics of learning organizations” (Ravangard et al., 2014, p. 2), but TE
did not exhibit a meaningful direct path coefficient with an OLC of 0.096, nor was it
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
This study demonstrated that there are meaningful relationships between both the
antecedents of OID and IC with the proposed mediator variable of an OLC. It should be
noted that while IC and OLC demonstrated discriminant validity at the HTMT90 level,
discriminant validity was not established between these constructs using the FornellLarker test or cross loading analysis. However, the HTMT ratio is the most robust
discriminant validity assessment performed. Additionally, the third proposed antecedent
of an OLC presented challenges. Not only did the construct of TE exhibit a statistically
insignificant relationship directly with an OLC, but it also did not exhibit meaningful or
statistically significant indirect relationships with either outcome variable. One
interesting thing to note is that TE exhibited a meaningful path coefficient of 0.64 and
statistical significance at the 0.01 level with CPO, when testing for partial mediation by
evaluating the direct relationships between antecedents and outcome variables. However,
both TE and CPO were unable to establish direct or indirect relationships with any other
constructs within the model. Alternatively, OCB-O displayed both statistically significant
and meaningful indirect relationships with the antecedents of OID and IC, as well as the
noted direct relationship with the mediator variable of an OLC. The comparison of the
results of the hypothesized structural model with the actual results gives insight into the
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broader meaning, and the key is that feelings of ownership are not collective in nature,
even though the citizenship behaviors are directed towards the organization.
When testing the alternative model, by replacing CPO with PO, nearly every other
relationship was statistically significant at the exploratory 0.10 level, apart from TE.
What this means is that by replacing the collective level feelings of ownership with
individual level feelings of ownership, except for relationships with TE, nearly every
other relationship is meaningful in the alternate model. One other thing to point out is that
the indirect relationship between OID and PO mediated through an OLC did not exhibit
statistical significance above the exploratory 0.10 level. While it is curious how the
measures for CPO and PO produced such different outcomes, there may be a plausible
explanation. The differences between CPO and PO may be the result of the cultural
background of the respondents within the sample. The sample respondents are all
employed by firms located in the United States, and their culture may not value
collectivist ideals. Su and Ng (2019) note that they were only able to validate another
version of a scale measuring CPO within the “collectivism-dominated culture” of China,
and it may be difficult to demonstrate CPO in an individualist society like the United
States (p. 11).
One thing of interest to highlight is that even when employees display actions
consistent with that of firm owners, such as OCB-O, there is not a statistically significant
relationship with general firm performance or return on assets (ROA). As noted earlier, a
relationship was not established between CPO and OCB-O, but even when replacing
CPO with PO in the alternative model, there was not a statistically significant indirect
relationship with firm performance or ROA. There are many potential reasons for this
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apparent disconnect. One such plausible explanation is that when an employee feels a
sense of ownership and behaves as such, what an employee views as the right thing to do
may not be aligned with what produces financially favorable outcomes for the firm. For
instance, an employee may feel the right thing to do is resolve every issue for every
customer but spending a great deal of time resolving an issue for an unprofitable
customer may not be in the best financial interest of the firm, which transitions the
discussion towards agency.
The principal and agent relationship does appear to be present at both the firm
owner and TMT level, as well as at lower supervisory relationships down the
organizational hierarchy. While supervisory status does not influence general firm
performance, the employee’s supervisory status positively influences the relationship
between an OLC and OCB-O. In essence, if an OLC exists, a supervisory employee is
more likely to engage in extra-role behaviors to the benefit of the firm than a nonsupervisory employee. Interestingly, the supervisory status does not meaningfully
influence any other relationship within the model. The results of this study provide
implications for both theory and practice, but there are a few limitations to discuss.

6.2 Limitations
Every study has limitations, and this one is no different. First, in measuring the
antecedent variables and the mediator variable simultaneously during the first employee
survey wave, there is potential for common methods bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Attrition in multi-wave surveys is always a concern, which is primarily why there were
two waves instead of three, but it should be noted that common methods bias was
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mitigated by time separating the measurement of the antecedents and mediator from the
measurement of the outcome variables. A second limitation is that the study only
included responses from six firms, with a total of thirty-nine employee responses to both
waves of the survey, and all of the respondents were employed in the geographically
concentrated area of Central Alabama. The third limitation of this study is that the
majority of the respondents came from the heavily regulated banking industry, where
there may be less opportunity for routine employee decisions aggregating into larger
amounts of agency cost. It should also be highlighted that building an OLC in the heavily
regulated banking industry is likely more challenging than in services businesses. The
fourth limitation is that this study only analyzed whether the employee was in a
supervisory role, rather than further delineating the level of supervisory responsibility
from first line manager to the top management team. The final limitation is that the
Delaney and Huselid (1996) and the Dess and Robinson (1984) measures were helpful in
gathering firm performance metrics to analyze the proposed inverse proximal measures
for agency costs, but these costs can only be calculated accurately with access to actual
financial performance records over time.

6.3 Theoretical Implications
This study initially set out to make a number of contributions to theory. First, this
study attempted to further integrate agency theory and PO by examining this relationship
at the collective level. Previously, this relationship has only been studied at the individual
level (Sieger et al., 2013). There were, however, challenges in establishing direct and
indirect relationships with CPO, likely given the western culture sampling of respondents
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(Ng & Su, 2018). On the other hand, this study does provide additional support for the
statistically significant and meaningful relationships established with PO at the individual
level. Given that it is impractical or impossible for agents to participate in the benefits of
legal ownership, understanding how to create favorable conditions for PO to emerge is all
the more important to examine. Even though CPO ultimately did not prove to be
meaningful, this exploratory study did further integrate agency theory and PO, and there
is a need for future studies of employee affect to be analyzed in tandem with actual firm
performance.
Second, this study attempted to apply agency theory to all organizational
members, where it has primarily been evaluated at the TMT level (Sieger et al., 2013).
Even with the sampling limitations above, this exploratory study does lay the foundation
to examine the potential influence of the level of management, from first line manager to
the top management team, on individual level PO and agency cost. Given that employees
in a supervisory position are more likely to engage in extra-role behaviors to the benefit
of the firm, as evidenced by OCB-O, there is likely to be some variance between the first
line managers and members of the TMT. The potential cascading effect of agency,
whereby every employee-supervisory relationship represents a principal-agent
relationship, should be explored further.
Third, this study attempted to explore the nascent relationship between an OLC
and CPO, given that other studies have not taken culture into consideration when
evaluating learning within organizations and teams (Pierce et al., 2018). While this
relationship was not established at the collective level, this study demonstrates a
meaningful relationship between an OLC and PO, which has not previously been
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established. Pierce et al. (2010) argues that group learning and psychological safety are
related to CPO, but these relationships have not been consistently demonstrated
empirically (Pierce et al., 2018). Even with an OLC, a group of employees may not
develop a sense of collective ownership for their respective employer’s firm, but this
study demonstrates that individually, employees tend to develop PO. PO makes a
tremendous difference in organizations, as it leads to both organizational commitment
and OCB-O, and these are favorable outcomes for a firm, even in the absence of tangible
financial performance metrics (Vandewalle et al., 1995). Thus, understanding more about
this relationship between OLC and PO merits further research. In addition to the
theoretical implications, this study has a number of practical implications for firm
managers.

6.4 Practical Implications
First, OID and an IC are solid predictors of an OLC within firms, and this can
provide a roadmap for firm managers to develop an OLC in their respective firms.
Traditional metrics of firm performance aside, an OLC can improve a firm’s ability to
adapt to change, as there are inertial forces within an organization highly resistant to
change that an OLC can help overcome (Becker, 1995). While many don’t enjoy the
discomfort of the unknown, change is inevitable, whether induced by internal or external
pressures. An OLC allows the firm not only to combat resistance to change, but the
investment of time and energy into an OLC also contributes to employees feeling a sense
of ownership in the firm (Giordano et al., 2020). This transitions the discussion towards
PO.
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Second, an OLC leads to employees feeling a greater sense of ownership towards
the firm and a willingness to perform actions perceived to be to the benefit of the firm, as
evidenced by the direct relationships between an OLC and PO, as well as between OLC
and OCB-O. Even though this study did not establish an indirect relationship between an
OLC and the inverse proximal indicators of agency costs, building an OLC still has great
value to management. This is especially true in firms undergoing rapid change. Employee
turnover is a tremendous problem in firms managing through radical transition, such as
mergers or acquisitions, and employees with a greater sense of PO are more likely to
remain with a firm, which directly influences the costs associated with turnover (Degbey
et al., 2021). Building an OLC sets the favorable conditions for PO to develop among
employees, which may also positively influence turnover costs. In addition to battling the
internal change, an OLC may also help dealing with external pressures.
Finally, there is a utilitarian value of learning within organizations, given the
ever-present prospect of environmental turbulence. With the COVID-19 shutdowns in
recent memory, nimble firms were able to overcome the adverse impacts of the broader
environment and adapt business models in a variety of ways to enable firms to survive
(Trentmann & Maurer, 2020). Additionally, organizational learning can also lead to a
number of positive outcomes for a firm such as improving products, processes, and
technology, as well as achieving enhanced competitiveness among peers and sustained
growth and success (Odor, 2019). Although there are some meaningful implications
listed above for theory and practice, there are a number of avenues available for future
research.
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6.5 Future Research
First, future research should examine a larger number of antecedents of an OLC,
and these antecedents should be collected at a separate time than OLC, to limit the
possibility of common methods bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Second, in order to ensure
broad generalizability, future research should evaluate a larger sample of individuals and
firms from a broader geographic area, perhaps from a regional, national, or an
international pool. Third, future research should test these relationships to a greater extent
in businesses where employees may have more autonomy to make routine decisions,
aggregating in higher potential agency costs. Fourth, future research should further
specify the level of management (i.e., first line manager, middle manager, senior
manager, and top manager), as this will permit the researcher to analyze these groups
separately to determine the degree of difference among the various tiers of management
within a firm. Finally, future research should test these relationships with publicly traded
firms or privately held firms, who provide financial statements over time, and this will
allow researchers to accurately measure agency cost, rather than relying on the inverse
proximal measures.

6.6 Conclusion
This study set out to examine the questions of whether the cost associated with the
entire set of principal-agent relationships within a firm matters to organizational
performance, and to examine how a firm minimizes the costs associated with agency, in
the absence of legal ownership interests. While the favorable firm outcomes of PO and
OCB-O are established with an OLC, these outcomes do not demonstrate a positive
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relationship with the proposed inverse proximal measures of agency costs. Stated
differently, higher levels of PO and OCB-O do not necessarily indicate lower levels of
agency costs. Even without a direct link reducing agency costs, there is tremendous value
in an OLC for the pragmatic purpose of assisting a firm to adapt to internal changes, as
well as changes in the environment. However, building this culture also creates favorable
conditions for employees to feel and behave as firm owners, as evidenced by the presence
of PO and OCB-O. Regardless, the influence of supervisory status on the outcome of
OCB-O indicates that agency may exist in relationships between supervisor and manager
at all echelons within an organization, and when examining agency, there is a need to
continue to look beyond the top management teams.
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Appendix B
Survey Scales and Disclosure Statement

Disclosure Statement
You are invited to voluntarily participate in a research project examining of the
culture in your work environment.
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the current work environment culture, and
subsequent outcomes. This survey should take no longer than 15 minutes to complete.
Participation will remain anonymous, and no identifying data will be collected. You will
be asked as series of questions in this survey to understand your perception of the culture
in your work environment.
You have the right to refuse to answer any questions that you do not wish to
complete and/or answer. Although there is no direct individual benefit for participation in
this study, the findings may prove to be highly valuable to management in improving the
culture in the work environment, as well as improving best practices across other
industries.
There are no risks identified for participation in this study. No incentives will be
provided for completing the surveys. All responses will be destroyed 180 days after all
data has been collected and the research project is completed. All information will be
used for research purposes only.
You can withdraw at any time without consequence. Please contact me at
scg1823@jagmail.southalabama.edu or the Institutional Review Board at the University
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of South Alabama at (251) 460-6308 if you have questions about your rights as a research
subject.
By selecting I Agree, you are acknowledging that you would like to participate in
the survey, and that you are employed and over 17 years of age.

Survey Scales
Time 1
Organizational Identification (Mael & Tetrick, 1992)
1. When someone criticizes (this organization), it feels like a personal insult.
2. I’m very interested in what others think about (this organization).
3. When I talk about this organization, I usually say “we” rather than they.
4. This organization’s successes are my successes.
5. When someone praises this organization, it feels like a personal compliment.
6. I act like (name of organization) person to a great extent.
7. If a story in the media criticized the organization, I would feel embarrassed.
8. I don’t act like a typical (name of organization) person. (R)
9. I have a number of qualities typical of (name of organization) people.
10. The limitation associated with (name of organization) people apply to me also.
Innovation Climate (Scott & Bruce, 1994)
1. Creativity is encouraged here.
2. Our ability to function creatively is respected by the leadership.
3. Around here, people are allowed to try to solve the same problems in different
ways.
4. The main function of members in this organization is to follow orders which
come down through channels. (R)
5. Around here, a person can get in a lot of trouble by being different. (R)
6. This organization can be described as flexible and continually adapting to change.
7. A person cannot do things that are too different around here without provoking
anger. (R)
8. The best way to get along in this organization is to think the way the rest of the
group does. (R)
9. People around here are expected to deal with problems in the same way. (R)
10. This organization is open and responsive to change.
11. The people in charge around here usually get credit for others' ideas. (R)
12. In this organization, we tend to stick to tried and true ways. (R)
13. This place seems to be more concerned with the status quo than with change. (R)
14. Assistance in developing new ideas is readily available.
15. There are adequate resources devoted to innovation in this organization.
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16. There is adequate time available to pursue creative ideas in this organization.
17. Lack of funding to investigate creative ideas is a problem in this organization. (R)
18. Personnel shortages inhibit innovation in this organization. (R)
19. This organization gives me free time to pursue creative ideas during the workday.
20. The reward system here encourages innovation.
21. This organization publicly recognizes those who are innovative.
22. The reward system here benefits mainly those who don't rock the boat. (R)
Team Empowerment (Kirkman et al., 2004)
1. My team/work group has confidence in itself.
2. My team/work group can get a lot done when it works hard.
3. My team/work group believes it can be very productive.
4. My team/work group believes its projects are significant.
5. My team/work group feels its tasks are worthwhile.
6. My team/work group feels its work is meaningful.
7. My team/work group can select different ways to do the team’s work.
8. My team/work group determines as a team how things are done in the team.
9. My team/work group makes its own choices without being told by management.
10. My team/work group has a positive impact on this company’s customers.
11. My team/work group performs tasks that matter to this company.
12. My team/work group makes a difference in this organization.
Organizational Learning Culture (Yang, 2003)
1. In my organization, people help each other learn.
2. In my organization, people are given time to support learning.
3. In my organization, people are rewarded for learning.
4. In my organization, people give open and honest feedback to each other.
5. In my organization, whenever people state their view, they also ask what others
think.
6. In my organization, people spend time building trust with each other.
7. In my organization, teams/work groups have the freedom to adapt their goals as
needed.
8. In my organization, teams/work groups revise their thinking as a result of group
discussions or information collected.
9. In my organization, teams/work groups are confident that the organization will act
on their recommendations.
10. My organization creates systems to measure gaps between current and expected
performance.
11. My organization makes its lessons learned available to all employees.
12. My organization measures the results of the time and resources spent on training.
13. My organization recognizes people for taking initiative.
14. My organization gives people control over the resources they need to accomplish
their work.
15. My organization supports employees who take calculated risks.
16. My organization encourages people to think from a global perspective.
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17. My organization works together with the outside community to meet mutual
needs.
18. My organization encourages people to get answers from across the organization
when solving problems.
19. In my organization, leaders mentor and coach those they lead.
20. In my organization, leaders continually look for opportunities to learn.
21. In my organization, leaders ensure the organization’s actions are consistent with
its values.
Time 2
Psychological Ownership (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004)
1. This is MY organization.
2. I sense that this organization is OUR company.
3. I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organization.
4. I sense that this is MY company.
5. This is OUR company.
6. Most of the people that work for this organization feel as though they own the
company.
7. It is hard for me to think about this organization as MINE. (R)
Collective Psychological Ownership (Pierce et al., 2018)
1. We (my team members and I) collectively agree that this is OUR job.
2. We (my team members and I) collectively feel that this job belongs to US
together.
3. We (my team members and I) feel a very high degree of collective (team)
ownership for this job.
4. All of the members of my work team feel as though we own this job collectively.
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Organizational (Lee & Allen, 2002)
1. Attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image.
2. Keep up with developments in the organization.
3. Defend the organization when other employees criticize it.
4. Show pride when representing the organization in public.
5. Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization.
6. Express loyalty toward the organization.
7. Take action to protect the organization from potential problems.
8. Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization.

119

Time 3
General Firm Performance (Delaney & Huselid, 1996)
1. How would you compare the organization’s performance over the past 3 years to
that of other organizations that do the same kind of work?
a. Quality of Products?
b. Quality of Services?
c. Quality of Programs?
d. Development of new Products?
e. Development of new Services?
f. Development of new Programs?
g. Ability to attract essential employees?
h. Ability to retain essential employees?
i. Satisfaction of customers or clients?
j. Relations between management and other employees?
k. Relations among employees in general?
2. Compared to other organizations that do the same kind of work, how would you
compare the organization’s performance over the last 3 years in terms of
Marketing?
a. Growth in sales?
b. Profitability?
c. Market share?
Return on Assets (Dess & Robinson, 1984)
1. Based on a scale from 1 – Lowest 20% to 5 –Top 20%, rate the approximate
performance of your business in comparison to other firms of similar sales
volume in your industry and region.
a. Firm total sales growth in the past 5 years.
b. Firm after-tax return on total assets in the past 5 years.
c. Overall firm performance/success in the past 5 years.
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